Relating System F and $\lambda_2$: A Case Study in Coq, Abella and Beluga

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Abstract

We give three formalisations of a proof of the equivalence of the usual, two-sorted presentation of System F and its single-sorted pure type system (PTS) variant $\lambda_2$. This is established by reducing the typability problem of F to $\lambda_2$ and vice versa. A key challenge is the treatment of variable binding and contextual information. The formalisations all share the same high level proof structure using relations to connect the type systems. They do, however, differ significantly in their representation and manipulation of variables and contextual information. In Coq, we use pure de Bruijn indices and parallel substitutions. In Abella, we use higher-order abstract syntax (HOAS) and nominal constants of the ambient reasoning logic. In Beluga, we also use HOAS but within contextual modal type theory. Our contribution is twofold. First, we present and compare a collection of machine-checked solutions to a non-trivial theoretical result. Second, we propose our proof as a benchmark, complementing the POPLmark and ORBI challenges by testing how well a given proof assistant or framework handles complex contextual information involving multiple type systems.

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1 Introduction

There are different presentations of “System F” in the literature and they are effectively considered equivalent, which is used to justify the transport of theoretical results between said presentations. The assumed notion of equivalence is primarily a reduction of the typability problem from one system to the other. While the existence of a suitable correspondence between the systems may appear likely or obvious, it turns out that actually proving it formally is surprisingly intricate. As long as the systems in question use the same expression syntax, the proofs are usually tedious but straightforward. If, on the other hand, not only the type systems, but also the syntactic languages differ, then establishing the correct correspondence becomes much more involved. The goal of this paper is to showcase various formalisation techniques to deal with the intricacies that arise in such an equivalence proof.

System F in its original form is due to Girard [14, 15], who introduced it in the context of proof theory. It was also independently discovered by Reynolds [26] as the polymorphic
In the following we present three formalisations. They all follow the same basic proof structure, outlined in Section 2, but they each deal with the complexities of contextual information and variable binding in different ways. In Sections 3, 4 and 5 we discuss in detail

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Ty} \\
A, B ::= X | A \rightarrow B | \forall X. A
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\text{Tm} \\
s, t ::= x | st | \lambda x : A. s | s A | \Lambda X. s
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\text{C} \\
\Delta ::= \emptyset | \Delta, X
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\text{C} \quad \Gamma ::= \bullet | \Gamma, x : A
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
X \in \Delta \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta \vdash X \rightarrow Y \\
\Delta \vdash X \\
\Delta \vdash Y
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta, \Gamma \vdash s : A \rightarrow B \\
\Delta, \Gamma \vdash t : A
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta, \Gamma \vdash X. A \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta, \Gamma \vdash \forall X. A \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\Gamma \vdash x : A \\
\lambda x : A. \Gamma \\
\Lambda A \Gamma
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Lambda \Delta \Gamma \\
\Delta \vdash \forall X. A
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta \vdash A \rightarrow B \\
\Delta \vdash B
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta \vdash X \rightarrow Y \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta \vdash Y
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\Delta ; \Lambda \Gamma \vdash s : A \rightarrow B \\
\Delta ; \Gamma \vdash t : A
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta ; \Gamma \vdash \forall X. A \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta ; \Gamma \vdash \exists X. A \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta ; \Gamma \vdash \forall X. A \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta ; \Gamma \vdash \exists X. A \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\Delta \vdash X. A \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta \vdash \forall X. A \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta \vdash \exists X. A \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta \vdash \forall X. A \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta \vdash \exists X. A \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\Delta ; \Gamma \vdash s : A \rightarrow B \\
\Delta ; \Gamma \vdash t : A
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta ; \Gamma \vdash \forall X. A \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta ; \Gamma \vdash \exists X. A \\
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\Delta ; \Gamma \vdash \exists X. A \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\Delta ; \Gamma \vdash s : A \\
\Delta ; \Gamma \vdash t : A
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta ; \Gamma \vdash \forall X. A \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta ; \Gamma \vdash \exists X. A \\
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\Delta ; \Gamma \vdash s : A \\
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\Delta \vdash X
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\Delta ; \Gamma \vdash \forall X. A \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
\Delta ; \Gamma \vdash \exists X. A \\
\Delta \vdash X
\end{array} \]
The Coq proof assistant, oldest among the three, is a general purpose theorem prover based on constructive type theory with no particular built-in support for meta-theoretical reasoning. Since all required structures have to be handled manually, library support is essential. In our case we use the Autosubst framework [28] that allows us to elegantly work with pure de Bruijn syntax and parallel substitutions.

In contrast, both Abella and Beluga allow us to work with higher-order abstract syntax (HOAS) [21], albeit in two rather different background logics. Both systems are designed explicitly with meta-theoretical reasoning in mind, with suitable support built into the foundation of each system. The core design of Abella is based around proof search and relational specifications. It predates the POPLmark challenge [2], which shaped the following decade of formalised meta theory. Meanwhile Beluga, youngest among the three, revisited and extended the Twelf logical framework [22] to directly support first-class syntactic contexts and substitutions in its type-theoretic foundation. This lead to the notion of contextual objects. Our three developments demonstrate how the various system designs affect a given formalisation effort.

While the comparison of proofs from different systems in terms of code lines is only marginally meaningful, we were surprised to find that all three developments each take approximately 500 loc, with Beluga slightly on the shorter side and Coq somewhat on the longer. This, however, only covers establishing the correspondence itself. The systems require vastly different amounts of code to establish the separate meta theories for the two discussed type systems, due to different levels of background support.

Contributions of the paper:
1. We present and compare three different machine checked formalisations of the technically intricate reduction of typability from System F to the PTS \( \lambda^2 \) and vice versa.\(^1\)
2. We propose that our equivalence proof serves as a benchmark for reasoning about and relating multiple type systems and languages involving variable binding. The key aspect of this benchmark is the representation and manipulation of contexts that track multiple kinds of information and exhibit complex dependency structures. As such it can be seen as a complement to the benchmarks proposed in [10, 9] and the POPLmark challenge [2].

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\(^1\) The accompanying developments can be found at https://www.ps.uni-saarland.de/extras/fscd17/
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## Equivalence

The core challenge of the proof is the fact that F clearly distinguishes types and terms with separate syntactic sorts, \( \text{T}y_F \) and \( \text{T}m_F \) respectively, while \( \lambda^2 \) merges these into a single syntactic sort \( \text{T}m_{\lambda^2} \). The distinction still exists in \( \lambda^2 \) but it is semantically imposed through the type system, rather than at the level of syntax. Further consequences are the existence of two variable scopes in F, with separate abstraction and application mechanisms, while the same concepts are uniformly represented in \( \lambda^2 \) for a single variable scope. This extends to the formation of function spaces as well. For an in-depth discussion of the mismatches between the two systems see [19]. In essence, the two systems differ in how explicit and readily available certain structural properties are. One half of the proof will thus have to reestablish implicit structures, which, as one would expect, is harder than removing it. This will lead to a certain asymmetry in proof effort for seemingly symmetrical lemma statements.

The basic idea of the proof presented here is to construct two relations \( \sim \) and \( \approx \) that put the types and respectively the terms of the two languages in correspondence (see Figure 3). To obtain the desired equivalence results, we have to demonstrate that these relations exhibit the following properties:

1. \( \sim \) is functional and injective.
2. \( \sim \) is left-total and type-formation preserving on the well-formed types of F.
3. \( \sim \) is right-total and type-formation preserving on the propositions of \( \lambda^2 \). A proposition of \( \lambda^2 \) is any term \( a \) such that \( \vdash \lambda a : * \) holds.
4. \( \approx \) is functional and injective.
5. \( \approx \) is left-total and typing preserving on the well-typed terms of F.
6. \( \approx \) is right-total and typing preserving on the proofs of \( \lambda^2 \). A proof of \( \lambda^2 \) is any term \( b \) such that \( \vdash \lambda b : a \) holds for \( a \) a proposition of \( \lambda^2 \).

We can now formulate, and easily prove, the following equivalences:

### Theorem 1 (Reductions from F to \( \lambda^2 \)).

\[
\begin{align*}
\vdash^F A & \iff \exists!a. \vdash A \sim a \land \vdash^\lambda a : * \\
\vdash^F s : A & \iff \exists!a. \vdash s \approx b \land \vdash A \sim a \land \vdash^\lambda b : a \land \vdash^\lambda a : *
\end{align*}
\]

**Proof.** The forward directions are simply the corresponding left-to-right preservation and left-totality results of \( \approx \) and \( \sim \). Uniqueness follows from functionality. For the inverse direction we use preservation (here from right to left) and uniqueness. ▶

### Theorem 2 (Reductions from \( \lambda^2 \) to F).

\[
\begin{align*}
\vdash^\lambda a : * & \iff \exists!A. \vdash A \sim a \land \vdash^F A \\
\vdash^\lambda b : a \land \vdash^\lambda a : * & \iff \exists!sA. \vdash s \approx b \land \vdash A \sim a \land \vdash^F s : A
\end{align*}
\]

**Proof.** Dual to the previous result. ▶

For the remainder of the paper, we focus on how F, \( \lambda^2 \) and the two relations \( \sim \) and \( \approx \) are represented in our three proof systems, and how the six main properties of the relations are obtained. Establishing Theorems 1 and 2 is in each case routine and hence not presented in detail.
\[ A, B ::= x_{by} \mid A \to B \mid \forall A \]
\[ s, t ::= x_{tm} \mid s \mid t \mid \lambda A. s \mid s A \mid \Lambda. s \]
\[ x, N : \mathbb{N} \]
\[ x < N \quad N \uparrow \Psi \quad A \quad N \uparrow \Psi \quad B \quad N + 1 \uparrow \Psi \quad \Delta \quad N \uparrow \Psi \quad A \quad N \uparrow \Psi \quad B \]
\[ N \uparrow \Psi \quad x_{by} \quad N \uparrow \Psi \quad A \to B \quad N \uparrow \Psi \quad \forall A \quad N \uparrow \Psi \quad x_{tm} : A \quad N \uparrow \Psi \quad s \quad B : A[B \cdot \text{id}] \]
\[ N + 1; \Gamma \quad \uparrow \Psi \quad s : A \quad N \uparrow \Psi \quad \Delta, s : \forall A \quad N \uparrow \Psi \quad A \quad N \uparrow \Psi \quad s : A \to B \quad N \uparrow \Psi \quad t : A \]

\[ \text{Figure 4} \] System F – de Bruijn encoding in Coq; term variable contexts \( \Gamma \) are lists of types.

\[ a, b, c, d ::= * \mid \square \mid x \mid a b \mid \lambda a. b \mid \Pi a. b \]
\[ x : \mathbb{N} \]
\[ \begin{array}{ll}
0 : a \uparrow \Psi, a & \quad x : a \in \lambda \Psi \\
(\lambda x. a) \uparrow \Psi & \quad \Psi \uparrow * : \square \quad x : a \in \lambda \Psi \\
\Psi \uparrow a : u & \quad \Psi \uparrow a : \Pi c. d \quad \Psi \uparrow b : c \quad \Psi \uparrow a : c \quad \Psi \uparrow a : \Pi a. c \\
\Psi \uparrow \Pi a. b : * & \quad \Psi \uparrow a b : d[a \cdot \text{id}] \quad \Psi \uparrow \lambda a. b : \Pi a. c
\end{array} \]

\[ \text{Figure 5} \] \( \lambda 2 \) – de Bruijn encoding in Coq; dependent contexts \( \Psi \) are lists of terms.

### 3 Coq

For the Coq proof we reuse the pure de Bruijn encoding of the two systems and the corresponding meta theories developed in [19], with major support from the Autosubst framework [28]. The language definitions are given in Figures 4 and 5. The main feature of de Bruijn syntax is the absence of variable names. Variables are instead represented as numerical indices, where \( n \) references the \( n^{th} \) enclosing binder of the correct scope. Dangling indices represent free variables that instead reference positions in an enclosing context, indexed from right to left. Note that we preserve the dot as a notational device to uniformly indicate the presence of a binding constructor, even if nothing remains to the left of it (e.g. \( \Lambda. s \)). It marks the precise spot where substitutions and indices have to be adjusted. The application of a parallel substitution \( \sigma \) to a term \( s \) is written \( s[\sigma] \) where \( \sigma \) is a function from \( \mathbb{N} \) that acts on all free variables of \( s \) at once. The Autosubst framework provides a normalisation procedure for such terms with applied substitutions. The existence of computable normal forms was demonstrated in [27]. Context morphism lemmas (CMLs) are a useful proof device to reason about judgements over pure de Bruijn syntax. In the following we will only focus on those aspects that have an immediate impact on our present proof. For an in-depth discussion of the interaction of pure de Bruijn syntax, parallel substitutions and CMLs we refer to [7, 27, 28, 1, 16, 19]. A brief overview is also given in Appendix A.

In the definition of \( F \) in Figure 4, observe how the type variable context \( \Delta \) degenerates to a plain natural number \( N \). It is taken as an exclusive upper bound to the admissible type variable indices, hence \( N = 0 \) represents the empty context. The term variable context \( \Gamma \) is simply a list of types, since free variables are coded as context positions. The substitution \( B \cdot \text{id} \) used in the type specialisation rule maps the free index 0 to \( B \) and lowers all other indices by 1.

We further observe that for \( \lambda 2 \), defined in Figure 5, context lookup is characterised inductively: \( x : a \in \lambda \Psi \). The need for this arises from the fact that the PTS contexts are dependent as well as the more general issue that in a de Bruijn setting, terms are not stable
Relating System F and \( \lambda 2 \) under context modifications. Hence, upon extraction of a term \( a \) from context \( \Gamma \), all free variables of \( a \) have to be adjusted by an amount that depends on the position of \( a \) in \( \Gamma \). The given inductive characterisation elegantly handles this complication.

The first equivalence proof. Similar to the way typing contexts are explicitly represented as lists of terms or types, we are going to track explicitly which variables are related in our definition of our relations \( \sim_R \) and \( \approx_R \). The relational parameters \( R \) and \( S \) correspond to the contexts \( \Theta \) and \( \Sigma \) from Figure 3:

\[
\begin{align*}
& x R y \quad \Theta \sim_R \Gamma \quad A \sim_R B \quad \Pi a. b \quad \forall A \sim_R \Pi^* a \quad x S y \\
&s \approx_R^S a \quad t \approx_R^S b \quad s \approx_R^S A \quad A \sim_R B \quad \lambda A. s \approx_R^S \lambda a. b \quad \Lambda. s \approx_R^S \lambda^* a
\end{align*}
\]

The parameters \( R \) and \( S \) track pairs of indices of type, and respectively, term variables. We technically represent them as lists of type \((\text{var} \times \text{var})\) and use \( x R y \) to denote that the pair \((x, y)\) is in \( R \). The interesting part of this definition is how these auxiliary parameters have to be modified when binders are traversed, which we denoted above by \( R^{\uparrow} \) and \( R^{\text{ext}} \).

In order to precisely define these operations, let us recall the required action on a parallel substitution \( \sigma \) that is pushed underneath a binder:

\[
(\forall A)[\sigma] \quad \mapsto \quad \forall A[0 \cdot \sigma \uparrow]
\]

The \([0 \cdot \_\_]\) part ensures that any index referencing the presently traversed binder is preserved as such. Meanwhile the \([\_, \_ \cdot \sigma \uparrow]\) part ensures that every index \( n + 1 \) is mapped to \( \sigma(n)[\uparrow] \), where the shift \( \uparrow \) ensures that no free variables in the range of \( \sigma \) are accidentally captured by the traversed binder.

In our correspondence proof we traverse binders almost in lockstep. For the simple cases where we have a binder on both sides of the relation, and moreover, the bound variables actually correspond according to the information tracked in \( R \), we define, analogously to the binder traversal for substitutions:

\[
R^{\text{ext}} := (0, 0) : \text{bimap} \uparrow \uparrow R
\]

where \( \text{bimap} f g R \) simply applies \( f \) to all left projections of \( R \) and \( g \) to all right projections.

The other possible scenario has a binder on the \( \lambda 2 \) side that has no counterpart in \( F \) with respect to the contextual information in \( R \), like the not-really dependent PTS product that corresponds to an arrow type in \( F \). As a consequence of this spurious binding, the \( \lambda 2 \) indices in \( R \) have to be shifted relative to their \( F \) counterparts. This one-sided index adjustment is obtained with

\[
R^\& := \text{bimap} \text{id} \uparrow R
\]

Fact 3. Both \( R^{\text{ext}} \) and \( R^\& \) preserve injectivity and functionality of \( R \).

Lemma 4. The type relation \( \sim_R \) is injective/functional, whenever \( R \) is injective/functional.

Proof. Straightforward inductions using Fact 3.

To obtain the same result for \( \approx_R^S \) we additionally rely on \( R \) and \( S \) having disjoint ranges, that is, no PTS variable is considered related to both a type and a term variable. We denote this by \( R \| S \).
Fact 5. The property $R \parallel S$ is preserved under extending one relation and shifting the other, that is w.l.o.g.: 

$$R \parallel S \Rightarrow R^{\uparrow} \parallel S^\text{ext}.$$  

Lemma 6. Disjointedness of ranges lifts from variable relations $R$ and $S$ to $\sim^R$ and $\approx_S^R$:

$$R \parallel S \Rightarrow A \sim^R a \Rightarrow s \approx_S^R a \Rightarrow \bot$$

Proof. By induction on $A \sim^R a$ and discriminating on $s \approx_S^R a$, using Fact 5.

Lemma 7. The term relation $\approx_S^R$ is functional, whenever $R$ and $S$ are functional. It is injective, whenever $R$ and $S$ are injective and $R \parallel S$ holds.

Proof. Straightforward inductions. Injectivity relies on the premise $R \parallel S$ and Lemma 6 to discharge non-matching applications. Subderivations for $\sim^R$ are handled with Lemma 4.

Proving the left and right totality and preservation results is slightly more interesting, as we have to generalise to open judgements and non-empty contexts. We achieve this with suitable proof invariants that are adapted from the notion of generalised context morphisms laid out in [19]. The key difference is that instead of a renaming $\xi$ that maps from one context to another, we here consider a relation on variables that places two contexts in correspondence. All invariants are set up such that they vacuously hold when the initial context happens to be empty. We start with type formation and the direction from $\text{F}$ to $\lambda_2$:

$$N \xrightarrow{R} \Psi := \forall x < N. \exists y. x R y \land y : \ast \in_\lambda \Psi$$

Fact 8. The invariant $N \xrightarrow{R} \Psi$ is preserved under corresponding extensions:

$$N \xrightarrow{R} \Psi \Rightarrow N \xrightarrow{R^\uparrow} \Psi, a \quad N \xrightarrow{R} \Psi \Rightarrow N + 1 \xrightarrow{R^{\text{ext}}} \Psi, \ast$$

Lemma 9. The type-relation $\sim^R$ is left-total and preserves type formation:

$$N \xleftarrow{R} A \Rightarrow \forall R \Psi. N \xrightarrow{R} \Psi \Rightarrow \exists a. A \sim^R a \land \Psi \downarrow a : \ast$$

Proof. By induction on $N \xleftarrow{R} A$. The two binder cases use Fact 8.

For the inverse direction we establish preservation of type formation and right totality along the following invariant:

$$N \xleftarrow{R} \Psi := \forall y. y : \ast \in_\lambda \Psi \Rightarrow \exists x. x R y \land x < N$$

Fact 10. The invariant $N \xleftarrow{R} \Psi$ is preserved under corresponding extensions:

$$N \xleftarrow{R} \Psi \Rightarrow \Psi \downarrow a : \ast \Rightarrow N \xleftarrow{R^\uparrow} \Psi, a \quad N \xleftarrow{R} \Psi \Rightarrow N + 1 \xleftarrow{R^{\text{ext}}} \Psi, \ast$$

Lemma 11. The type-relation $\sim^R$ is right-total and preserves type formation:

$$\Gamma \downarrow_\ast a : \ast \Rightarrow \forall R N. N \xleftarrow{R} \Gamma \Rightarrow \exists A. A \sim^R a \land N \xrightarrow{\Psi} A$$

Proof. Induction on $\Gamma \downarrow_\ast a : \ast$, using Fact 10. One complication is the disambiguation of a given PTS-product $\Pi a. b$, where $a$ is known to live in some universe $u$. Discriminating on $u$ allows us to correctly choose either an arrow type $A \rightarrow B$, or a universal quantification $\forall. B$. Further requirements are the degeneracy of the universe $\Box$ (\ast is the only inhabitant of $\Box$), as well as propagation and substitutivity for $\downarrow_\ast$.  

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The preservation and totality results for $\approx^R_S$ make the overhead for explicitly tracking contextual information most apparent. Since some of the typing rules for applications ascribe types that are constructed from a non-trivial substitution operation, we require substitutivity results for the judgements under consideration; in particular, $\beta$-substitutivity for $\sim^R$:

**Fact 12.** The type relation $\sim^R$ is closed under $\beta$-substitutions:

$$B \sim^R b \implies A \sim^R a \implies A[B \cdot \text{id}] \sim^R a[b \cdot \text{id}]$$

The proof of this fact is a lengthy but straightforward construction that first generalises the abstractions and applications correctly.

**Fact 13.** The invariant $\Gamma \xrightarrow{R} S \Psi$ is preserved under corresponding extensions:

$$\Gamma \xrightarrow{R} S \Psi \implies A \sim^R a \implies \Gamma, A \xrightarrow{R} S^* \Psi, a \quad \Gamma \xrightarrow{R} S \Psi \implies \Gamma[\xi] \xrightarrow{R} S^* \Psi, \#$$

**Lemma 14.** The term relation $\approx^R_S$ is left-total and preserves typing.

$$N; \Gamma \xrightarrow{\text{in}} s : A \implies \forall R \Psi. R \text{func} \implies N \xrightarrow{R} S \Psi \implies \Gamma \xrightarrow{R} S \Psi \implies \exists x a. A \sim^R a \land s \approx^R b \land \Psi \uparrow b : a \land \Psi \uparrow \uparrow a : *$$

**Proof.** By induction on $N; \Gamma \xrightarrow{\text{in}} s : A$. Both the invariant $\Gamma \xrightarrow{R} S \Psi$, as well as Lemma 9, are used to obtain related types in the variable case. Functionality of $R$ allows us to equate these.

The final part is the preservation of typing from $\lambda 2$ to $F$. Here we use:

$$\Gamma \xleftarrow{R} S \Psi := \forall x A, \Gamma_x = A \implies \exists y a. A \sim^R a \land x Sy \land y : a \in_{\lambda} \Psi$$

**Fact 15.** The invariant $\Gamma \xleftarrow{R} S \Psi$ is preserved under corresponding extensions:

$$\Gamma \xleftarrow{R} S \Psi \implies A \sim^R a \implies \Gamma, A \xleftarrow{R} S^* \Psi, a \quad \Gamma \xleftarrow{R} S \Psi \implies \Gamma[\xi] \xleftarrow{R} S^* \Psi, \#$$

**Lemma 16.** The term relation $\approx^R_S$ is right-total and preserves typing:

$$\Psi \uparrow a : * \implies \Psi \uparrow b : a \implies \forall R \Psi. R \text{func} \implies N \xleftarrow{R} S \Psi \implies \Gamma \xleftarrow{R} S \Psi \implies \exists x A. A \sim^R a \land s \approx^R b \land N; \Gamma \xrightarrow{\text{in}} s : A \land N \xrightarrow{\text{in}} \uparrow s A$$

**Proof.** By induction on $\Psi \uparrow b : a$. The cases are mostly analogous to the previous result. Injectivity of $R$ is required for the variable case. Note that we need to discriminate on the universes of product domains again (cf. Lemma 11), here to disambiguate the unified abstractions and applications correctly.
in $G$ are represented using extension rules. This process is often referred to as level, hence
and locally quantified ($\{\}$ of a representation of object level variables relies on this freshness guarantee.

Reasoning about HOAS encodings inductively is somewhat complicated, as terms do not remain closed and escape into the host theory. To get around this, Abella is designed around the so-called two-level logic approach. The lower
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not remain closed and escape into the host theory. To get around this, Abella is designed
at the meta level, which we denote by $\lambda a. b : \lambda c$. The

At this point we can make an interesting observation. The above proof demonstrates
that the CML proof pattern not only generalises to a multi system setting [19] but also to
relations in place of functional correspondences. This is what allowed us to quickly generate all the contextual invariants needed for the various results.

4 Abella

Abella supports the use of higher-order abstract syntax (HOAS) [21]. The main idea is to delegate variable binding at the object level to binding at the meta level. Take for example the term constructor $\text{lamb} : (\text{tm} \to \text{tm}) \to \text{tm}$ that yields an abstraction of the untyped $\lambda$-calculus. The $s$ in $\text{lamb} \ s$ is a function of the meta level. Substitution at the object level is implemented as application at the meta level, which we denote by $s(t)$ to distinguish it from the various object level applications.

Reasoning about HOAS encodings inductively is somewhat complicated, as terms do not remain closed and escape into the host theory. To get around this, Abella is designed around the so-called two-level logic approach. The lower specification level, essentially verbatim $\lambda$Prolog, is used to encode the object languages and their associated judgements. One then reasons about these encodings at the meta level, using the logic $G$, which is the intuitionistic predicative fragment of Church’s simple type theory, extended with natural induction, (co)inductive predicates and nominal quantification ($\nabla x. s$) [11, 12]. The axioms of $G$ ensure that a $\nabla$-quantified identifier is fresh for everything bound above it. The faithful representation of object level variables relies on this freshness guarantee.

The two levels are connected with a special inductive predicate that embeds the derivation of a $\lambda$Prolog judgement $J$ from hypotheses $L = I_0, \ldots, I_n$ into $G$, written $\{L \vdash J\}$, or simply $\{J\}$ in the absence of assumptions. Note that $\lambda$Prolog supports hypothetical ($J_1 \Rightarrow J_2$) and locally quantified ($\Pi x. J[x]$) premises, which the embedding treats as follows:

\[
\{L \vdash J_1 \Rightarrow J_2\} \leadsto \{L, J_1 \vdash J_2\} \quad \text{and} \quad \{L \vdash \Pi x. J[x]\} \leadsto \nabla x. \{L \vdash J[x]\}
\]

For the quantification case, observe that the context $L$ is usually bound at the outermost level, hence $x$ is guaranteed to be fresh for $L$, satisfying the usual side condition for context extension rules. This process is often referred to as mobility of binders: object level binders are represented using $\lambda$Prolog quantification, which in turn is mapped to $\nabla$-quantification in $G$ and eventually opened with nominal constants $n_i$. 

\begin{align*}
\text{Abella} 
\end{align*}
Fact 17. The embedding \( \{ L \vdash J \} \) satisfies cut and a nominal instantiation principle:

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ L \vdash I \} & \implies \{ L, I \vdash J \} \implies \{ L \vdash J \} & \text{(cut)} \\
\forall s: \text{type of } n_i \cdot \{ L[n_i] \vdash J[n_i] \} & \implies \{ L[s] \vdash J[s] \} & \text{(inst)}
\end{align*}
\]

Both are exposed as proof tactics to the user.

Note that Fact 17 provides substitutivity for the various judgements of our object languages. It is also worth noting that only the judgements, but not the specification level types like \( \text{TM}_\lambda \) and \( \text{Ty}_F \), are embedded, so we cannot induct directly on our syntax definitions.

At this point it should be straightforward to understand the HOAS representation of our two systems given in Figures 6 and 7.\(^2\) For \( F \), the judgements \( A \text{ty} \) and \( s : F A \) encode type formation and respectively typing. For \( \lambda 2 \), the judgement \( U u \) is used to recognise universes, while \( a : \lambda t b \) represents PTS typing.

As soon as we try to prove structural results about these definitions we are faced with a problem. Consider the following inversion principle for arrow type formation in \( F \):

\[
\{ L \vdash A \rightarrow B \text{ty} \} \implies \{ L \vdash A \text{ty} \} \land \{ L \vdash B \text{ty} \}
\]

The premise may hold not only due to structural reasons, as claimed by the lemma, but also due to backchaining and \( A \rightarrow B \text{ty} \in L \). The problem is that \( L \) is too general and may contain arbitrary judgements, not even necessarily related to type formation. Hence we need to somehow constrain \( L \) to only contain judgements of the form \( n_i \text{ty} \), where the \( n_i \) are nominals representing variables. Similarly we want to constrain typing contexts to only contain judgements of the form \( n_i \text{ty} \) or \( n_i : F A \). We specify this notion of well-formed contexts with auxiliary inductive \( \mathcal{G} \)-predicates. The well-formedness predicate for \( F \) typing contexts, written \( C^\text{fm}(\cdot) \), is defined as:

\[
\begin{align*}
& \frac{C^\text{fm}(L) \quad x \notin L} {C^\text{fm}(L, x \text{ty})} \quad \frac{x \notin L, A} {C^\text{fm}(L, x : F A)} \quad \frac{C^\text{fm}(L) \quad \{ L \vdash A \text{ty} \}} {C^\text{fm}(L) \quad \{ L \vdash B \text{ty} \}}
\end{align*}
\]

The freshness conditions are implemented by locally \( \nabla \)-quantifying the respective variable. Next we have to pair this definition with an inversion principle that reveals the structure and freshness properties of any \( J \in L \) with \( C^\text{fm}(L) \). At this point we are able to add \( C^\text{st}(L) \), defined analogously to \( C^\text{fm}(L) \), as an extra premise to our inversion principle and then discard the spurious context extraction. This relies on the fact that \( \nabla x . (A \rightarrow B) \neq x \) holds in \( \mathcal{G} \). A key aspect of formalising our equivalence result in Abella is the correct choice of well-formedness predicates and associated inversion lemmas.

The second equivalence proof. The relations \( \sim \) and \( \approx \) are defined as:

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pi x. B \sim b(x) & \quad \Pi x y. x \sim y \Rightarrow A(x) \sim a(y) & \quad s \approx a \quad t \approx b \\
A \rightarrow B \sim \Pi a. b & \quad \forall A \sim \Pi *, a & \quad s t \approx a b \\
A \sim a \quad \Pi x. y \sim b(y) & \quad \Pi x y. x \sim y \Rightarrow s(x) \approx a(y) & \quad s A \approx a b \approx a b \\
\lambda A. s \approx \lambda a, b & \quad \lambda s. a \approx \lambda*, a \quad \lambda \approx a b
\end{align*}
\]

We complement this definition with a well-formedness predicate \( C^\text{w}(L) \), which ascertains that \( L \) only contains judgements of the form \( n_i \sim n_j \) or \( n_i \approx n_j \), together with suitable lookup

\(^2\) The HOAS language definitions are standard. See also Appendix B for reference.
lemmas. For technical reasons we do not define $C_w(-)$ and instead prove a strengthening lemma which holds due to the inferred subordination ordering of the two relations:

$$C_w(L) \implies \{ L, x \approx y \vdash A \sim a \} \implies \{ L \vdash A \sim a \}$$

Before we go on, it is interesting to consider the information encapsulated in $C_w(L)$. The obvious part is that $L$ contains exactly the same information about corresponding variables that we had to track in Coq with the auxiliary parameters $R$ and $S$. In addition, since $L$ only contains pairings of fresh nominals, we immediately obtain that $L$ is functional and injective. Lifting these properties to $\sim$ and then to $\approx$ are routine inductions.

When it comes to the totality and preservation statements, things become more interesting. The remaining four lemma statements are generalised over three different contexts belonging to the three involved judgements. Not only do we require these contexts to be locally well-formed, but we also have to connect them. We achieve this with a single ternary well-formedness predicate, $C_R(-|-|-)$, defined as follows:

$$C_R(\ast | \ast | \ast) \quad \frac{C_R(\ell F | L| L\lambda \land x,y \notin L_i)}{C_R(\ell F \cdot x \cdot y | L| x \sim y | L\lambda \\ y: \lambda a) \quad \frac{\{ L_\ell \vdash A ty \} \land \{ L_i \vdash A \sim a \}}{\{ L_\iota \vdash a : \iota \} \land \{ L_\lambda \vdash a : \lambda a \} \quad \frac{C_R(LF \cdot L| L| L\lambda \land x,y \notin L_i)}{C_R(LF \cdot L| A | L| x \sim y | L\lambda \\ y: \lambda a) \quad \frac{\{ L_\ell \vdash A ty \} \land \{ L_i \vdash A \sim a \} \land \{ L_\iota \vdash a : \iota \}}{\{ L_\lambda \vdash a : \lambda a \}}}$$

When a binder is traversed, this ensures that all three contexts are extended with the same freshly chosen variables $x$ and $y$. The definition is accompanied by three extraction lemmas, one for each of the three involved contexts, which provide the associated judgements from the two other contexts. Recall that in Coq we had four separate invariants for the four preservation and totality lemmas. Here, this information is uniformly encoded in $C_R(LF \cdot L| L| L\lambda)$ and we use it for all four proofs.

**Lemma 18.** The type relation $\sim$ is total from $F$ to $\lambda 2$ and preserves type formation.

$$\{ L_\ell \vdash A ty \} \implies \forall L_i L_\iota L_\lambda. C_R(LF \cdot L| L| L\lambda) \implies \exists a. \{ L_\iota \vdash A \sim a \} \land \{ L_\lambda \vdash a : \lambda a \}$$

**Proof.** By induction on $\{ L_\ell \vdash A ty \}$. ▶

As a trivial corollary we obtain: $\{ A ty \} \implies \exists a. \{ A \sim a \} \land \{ a : \lambda a \}.

The proofs of the remaining three preservation results are surprisingly analogue, so we will not go into further detail. It is worth pointing out, though, that we again require the degeneracy of the PTS universe $\square$, as well as propagation for both $F$ and $\lambda 2$ in various places. The HOAS setup allows us to obtain these easily.

5 **Beluga**

The programming and proof environment Beluga [24, 25] is another system that supports HOAS. Object languages are encoded in the logical framework LF [18], while proofs about these are expressed as total programs in contextual modal type theory, Beluga’S reasoning logic. The programs analyse LF derivation trees using pattern matching and higher-order unification. In Beluga, it is necessary to give programs (i.e. proof terms) explicitly, which are proof checked as part of type checking. This stands in contrast to Coq and Abella, both of which are interactive systems with a tacit language for proof term construction.

The biggest difference, however, lies with Beluga’s treatment of object level variables. In particular, at the outermost level, there is no such thing as a free object variable. This is in stark contrast to Coq’s dangling de Bruijn indices and Abella’s global nominal constants.
In Beluga we instead deal with *contextual objects*, written \([\Gamma \vdash K]\), that is objects \(K\) (like types, terms, typing derivations) paired with contexts \(\Gamma\) in which they are meaningful [20, 23]. One of the main advantages of contextual objects is that they remain closed under inductive reasoning. Hence they constitute an alternative to Abella’s two-level logical embedding.

As an example, consider the function type \(X \rightarrow X\) where \(X\) is a free type variable. This function type is ill-formed under the empty type variable context \(\Delta = \emptyset\). In Coq and Abella we can express this type, as \(0_{ty} \rightarrow 0_{ty}\) and respectively \(n_0 \rightarrow n_0\). We can then show that assuming well-formedness under the empty context entails absurdity, \(0 \not\in 0_{ty} \rightarrow 0_{ty} \implies \bot\) and \(\{\bullet \vdash n_0 \rightarrow n_0_{ty}\} \implies \bot\). Meanwhile in Beluga, we observe that the contextual object \([\bullet \vdash x \rightarrow x]\) is not even syntactically well-formed, since \(x \not\in \bullet\). An immediate consequence of this is that the type formation judgement for \(F\), which ensures that the context is covering all free type variables, becomes redundant. Hence Beluga’s definition of \(F\) is obtained from Figure 6 by removing all references to type formation. The definition of \(\lambda_2\) is identical to the one for Abella (Figure 7).

Recall that context management was completely manual in Coq. Each judgement required well-chosen generalisations and custom invariants to accurately track contextual information.

In Abella the situation was noticeably better, as contexts at the object level were kept implicit and handled by the system. At the reasoning level they did, however, surface as explicit, unstructured sequences of judgements. The desired contextual structure then had to be imposed with auxiliary predicates, together with copious amounts of inversion lemmas.

Beluga contexts, on the other hand, are sequences of not necessarily homogeneous declarations. Each declaration can depend on prior declarations and encapsulate multiple pieces of related information using a dependent record. Contexts are first class citizens and *context schema ascription*, \(\Gamma : S\), is used to ensure that a given context \(\Gamma\) satisfies certain structural constraints.

Schemas are Beluga’s main device to enforce invariants on contextual information. We use propagation for \(\lambda_2\) as an example. The requisite schema is:

\[
S_{\lambda W} := [x : Tm_{\lambda}, x : \lambda \ast] + [x : Tm_{\lambda}, x : \lambda a, a : \lambda \ast]
\]

Note how it separates PTS variables into type and term variables via the associated typing information, which already imposes the necessary semantic contextual information.

The proof of propagation is straightforward. We implement a total recursive function \(k\) satisfying:

\[
k : \forall \Gamma: S_{\lambda W}. [\Gamma \vdash a : \lambda b] \implies [\Gamma \vdash \text{type\_correct } b]
\]

The contextual predicate \([\Gamma \vdash \text{type\_correct } b]\) encodes that \(b\) is either \(\Box\) or it can be typed with some universe \(u\). We pattern match \(D : [\Gamma \vdash a : \lambda b]\) and obtain seven cases. The first four are structural, recursively descending into sub-derivations. The only part that is non-obvious is the traversal of binders, where various pieces of information are added to the context. These have to be packaged into declaration blocks in order to satisfy \(S_{\lambda W}\) for the recursive call. More interesting though are the three base cases. When we compare the matched type against \(S_{\lambda W}\), we observe three ways in which \(D\) could have been obtained from the context. The first and third are trivial as they unify \(b\) with \(\ast\) which can be typed with the universe \(\Box\). For the remaining case we know that \(b\) can be typed with the universe \(\ast\), contextual information that was packaged together with the matched judgement. Note

3 For a concrete presentation of the resulting definitions, see Appendix B.
that throughout the construction we exploit that Beluga natively supports substitution into parametric sub-derivations.

**The third equivalence proof.** The definitions of $\sim$ and $\approx$ exactly coincide with Abella. We are going to primarily concern ourselves with the schemas, which best illustrate Beluga’s tracking of contextual information.

We begin with the functionality and injectivity properties of $\sim$ and $\approx$. Since equality is not native in Beluga we have to define equality predicates for each context record to express our statements. The tightest invariants that hold for the rules defining $\sim$ and $\approx$ can be expressed with the following context schemas:

$$S_\sim := [x: Ty, y: Tm, x \sim y] + [y: Tm]$$
$$S_\approx := [x: Ty, y: Tm, x \sim y] + [x: Ty, y: Tm, x \approx y]$$

Due to the subordination ordering of $\sim$ and $\approx$, Beluga is capable of automatically strengthening from $S_\approx$ to $S_\sim$, and weaken vice versa (see also [29]).

**Lemma 19.** There exist total recursive functions $f_{Ty}, f_{Tm}, i_{Ty}$ and $i_{Tm}$, satisfying

$$f_{Ty}: \forall \Gamma: S_\sim. \ [\Gamma \vdash A \sim a] \implies [\Gamma \vdash A \sim a'] \implies [\Gamma \vdash a =_\lambda a']$$
$$i_{Ty}: \forall \Gamma: S_\sim. \ [\Gamma \vdash A \sim a] \implies [\Gamma \vdash A =_F A']$$
$$f_{Tm}: \forall \Gamma: S_\sim. \ [\Gamma \vdash s \approx a] \implies [\Gamma \vdash s \approx a'] \implies [\Gamma \vdash a =_\lambda a']$$
$$i_{Tm}: \forall \Gamma: S_\sim. \ [\Gamma \vdash s \approx a] \implies [\Gamma \vdash s =_F s']$$

**Proof.** Each by induction on the first premise and pattern matching on the second. In the variable cases we have matched against two context records $r$ and $r'$. Since $x$ and $y$ are local to $r$ and one of them is shared between the two matched records, unification infers $r = r'$, closing the case. Note that $f_{Tm}$ and $i_{Tm}$ contain calls to $f_{Ty}$ and respectively $i_{Ty}$, which relies on context strengthening. For $i_{Tm}$ we also again require disjointness of the two relations, which is easily obtainable under contexts satisfying $S_\approx$.

For the remaining four totality and preservation proofs we have to deal with two complications. First, we have to remove assumptions and conclusions referring to $F$ type formation. Second, we have to define predicates that capture the existential nature of the four conclusions, including relevant typing information, with custom predicates. We have, for example,

$$\text{exists_rel_prop} s A \iff \exists b a. s \approx b \land A \sim a \land b : \lambda a \land a : \lambda s$$

The required context schemas are quite involved:

$$S_\sim_W := [x: Ty, y: Tm, x \sim y, y : \lambda s] + [y: Tm, y : \lambda a]$$
$$S_\approx_W := [x: Ty, y: Tm, x \sim y, y : \lambda s] + [y: Tm, y : \lambda a, A \sim a, a : \lambda s]$$
$$S_W := [x: Ty, y: Tm, x \sim y, y : \lambda s] + [x: Ty, y: Tm, x \approx y, x : \lambda A, y : \lambda a, A \sim a]$$

**Lemma 20.** There exist total recursive functions $p_{\sim}^\sim, p_{\sim}^\approx, p_{\approx}^\sim$ and $p_{\approx}^\approx$, satisfying

$$p_{\sim}^\sim : \forall \Gamma: S_\sim_W. \ [\Gamma \vdash \text{exists_rel_prop} A]$$
$$p_{\sim}^\approx : \forall \Gamma: S_\approx_W. \ [\Gamma \vdash a : \lambda s] \implies [\Gamma \vdash \text{exists_rel_type} a]$$
$$p_{\approx}^\sim : \forall \Gamma: S_\approx_W. \ [\Gamma \vdash s : \lambda A] \implies [\Gamma \vdash \text{exists_rel_proof} s A]$$
$$p_{\approx}^\approx : \forall \Gamma: S_W. \ [\Gamma \vdash b : \lambda a] \implies [\Gamma \vdash a : \lambda s] \implies [\Gamma \vdash \text{exists_rel_term} b a]$$
Proof. The first is by induction on \( A : [\Gamma \vdash \mathbb{Ty}_F] \) (recall that this was not possible in Abella), the others are by induction on the first premise. The proofs are quite technical but mostly straightforward. The construction of \( p^<_\varnothing \), needs \( \lambda 2 \) propagation. Interestingly, neither propagation in F nor the degeneracy of \( \Box \) are needed, as unification automatically handles the respective occurrences.

The most interesting part of the Beluga development appears to be the particularly rich structure and interdependencies of the various schemas. We would like to point out in particular, that while the schemas \( S_\varnothing \) and \( S_\approx \) could likely be inferred automatically by inspecting the involved type families, this does not appear to work for those schemas with auxiliary well-typedness assumptions (subscript \( W \)). This contradicts the common belief that schema inference should in principle always be possible.

The schemas can be further arranged in a hierarchy (Figure 8). A context satisfying \( S_\varnothing \) can always be weakened to one sitting lower in the hierarchy. The hierarchy also induces a strengthening relationship, going upwards, as long as the subordination order of judgements under said contexts is respected.

6 Adequacy

To put any trust in the formalisations we have just discussed, we have to briefly consider the issue of adequacy. That is, we have to argue why our formal definitions correspond to our intuitive understanding of the mathematical objects at hand.

For the de Bruijn setup in Coq, the question does not really arise, as it is a well understood first-order encoding. The representation of the syntax is comparable to any other inductive datatype, like say natural numbers or lists. It is our understanding that a de Bruijn encoding is the canonical implementation of the Barendregt convention. The fact that all three proof assistants used here are internally implemented using de Bruijn supports this belief.

The situation is quite different for our HOAS encodings, as they borrow their function spaces and substitution mechanisms directly from their host environment. When HOAS was first introduced it was not at all clear that this would yield sensible syntactic structures. Thus since at least the 1990s a lot of techniques were developed to argue that such definitions are faithful. We rely on these to trust our language definitions.

When it comes to the HOAS type systems and proofs about them, the situation becomes less clear, as both Abella and Beluga go beyond basic \( \lambda \)-tree syntax and exploit subordination to justify the inductiveness of certain proofs. Here we can argue adequacy based on two facts. First, we have proven that in each case two variants of intuitively the same mathematical system do in fact behave the same and the encodings also admit all the expected properties. Second, we were able to replay the same overall proof structure that worked for the de Bruijn approach on the HOAS encodings. Taken together, this stability within and across proof systems allows us to assume the adequacy of representations until evidence to the contrary is provided.

7 Conclusion

We have considered a technically interesting proof and demonstrated how various formalisation techniques deal with the arising intricacies. The development of three different formalisations
allowed us to gain deep insights into the inherent complexities of the proof. In particular we were able to separate these from technical artefacts due to the chosen formalisation technique. Two examples of inherent complications are the not quite perfectly aligned binding structures and the missing typing information required to disambiguate the uniform PTS applications.

Our set of developments demonstrates that the various formalisation techniques can be arranged in a hierarchy of abstraction layers. At the lowest level we have pure de Bruijn with a lot of representation freedom, which, however, has to be manged manually. Higher up in the hierarchy sit the HOAS techniques, which hide a lot of the technicalities and provide a more meaningful abstraction. In comparison with Abella, Beluga appears to deliver the theoretically nicer interface, with the added features of contextual reasoning and the ability to perform inductions directly over the HOAS syntax. Practically though, both systems are relatively young with certain usability issues. Among the two, Abella’s tactic language certainly gives it a head start.

We observe that our proof contains a number of challenges that, taken as a whole, constitute a nice benchmark for systems designed to reason about type systems. It tests in particular, how well multiple type systems with binding constructs can be brought into correspondence. We hence propose it as a complement to the POPLmark challenge [2] on the one hand, which solely tests how well a framework can reason about a single type system, and the ORBI benchmarks [10, 9] which cover small-scale contextual reasoning. It is our belief that such a benchmark could be very useful to those who seek to develop or improve frameworks for reasoning about type systems and similar syntactic systems with variable binding and complex contextual information.

We have come to the conclusion that there appears to be no “silver bullet” solution. There exist various approaches and they all have their merits and drawbacks. The question is not so much about whether de Bruijn or HOAS is better, but what techniques pair well with each approach. We have highlighted some of these here but there are of course further approaches (see below). A comprehensive survey, while desirable, would certainly exceed the scope of this format, but we hope that our work constitutes a small step towards such a catalogue of techniques. To conclude, we found that reworking the same proof in multiple frameworks was quite enlightening.

**Future Work.** We would like to continue into three largely orthogonal directions.

First, we would like to widen the scope of the benchmark itself and include a correspondence result for the computational behaviour of the two systems. Equi-reducebility is at least as interesting a problem as equi-typability, and likely to pose its own set of challenges. One of these is the fact that, prior to typing, \( \lambda \) has a lot more \( \beta \)-redices than its two-sorted counterpart, hence some form of typing information will have to be tracked along with the relational assumptions. This will lead to new forms of contexts that are likely comparable in complexity to those discussed here.

Second, we would like to test further frameworks against our benchmark. One candidate is the locally nameless approach [3]. It provides an abstraction layer that sits somewhere between pure de Bruijn and HOAS. Our benchmark could test the stability of this layer. Another is the HYBRID framework [8] that aims to bring HOAS to Coq. At present however, it is neither equipped with Abella’s \( \nabla \) nor Beluga’s contextual types, so it remains to be seen if it can handle our challenge. Note that the HYBRID library exists in Isabelle as well. The rich context structures could also pose an interesting challenge for systems like Twelf [22].

Finally, we consider scaling the challenge both down to the simply typed \( \lambda \)-calculus, as well as up to \( F_{\omega} \), to obtain a better understanding of where exactly certain complications originate from.
De Bruijn Definitions

We summarise the core concepts of de Bruijn with parallel substitutions. The main feature of de Bruijn syntax is the absence of variable names, yielding concrete canonical representations for the on-paper implicitly assumed $\alpha$-equivalence classes of syntactic expressions. Instead of using names, variables are represented as numerical indices, where $n$ references the $n$-th enclosing binder of the corresponding scope, counting from 0. We illustrate the concepts using the two-sorted variant of System F that is discussed in the main text:

$$A, B ::= \text{xy} \mid A \rightarrow B \mid \forall A \quad s, t ::= \text{xm} \mid st \mid \lambda A. s \mid sA \mid A. s \quad x : \mathbb{N}$$

Note that the $A$ in $\lambda A. s$ is the type of the bound term variable, not its name. Dangling indices correspond to free variables. They are taken as indices into an ambient context which is normally represented as a list of the information attached to each variable. A standard typing context $\Gamma$ is represented as a simple list of types.

To understand the instantiation of terms or types with parallel substitutions, let us first recall a few primitives of the $\sigma$-calculus (see [1] for details):

$$\begin{align*}
(M \cdot \sigma) 0 & := M \\
(M \cdot \sigma) (x + 1) & := \sigma x \\
\uparrow x & := (x + 1) \\
id & := 0 \cdot \uparrow
\end{align*}$$

Parallel substitutions $\sigma : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$, where $\mathcal{T}$ is some syntactic sort, can be seen as streams $M_0, M_1, \ldots$, with $M_i : \mathcal{T}$. This motivates the notion of the $\text{cons}$ operation $M \cdot \sigma$, which maps the index 0 to $M$, and all other indices $x + 1$ to $\sigma x$. The $\text{shift}$ operation $\uparrow$ simply raises all indices by one, and the identity substitution $\text{id}$ is a derived notion. The concrete type of substitutions and a corresponding instance of this framework depends on the syntactic sort for which a notion of substitution is defined.

Let us first consider the types of our example. The instantiation of a type $A$ with a parallel substitution $\sigma$, written $A[\sigma]$, is defined mutually recursive with the forward composition of parallel substitutions.

$$\begin{align*}
\text{xm}[\sigma] & = \sigma \text{xy} \\
(A \rightarrow B)[\sigma] & = A[\sigma] \rightarrow B[\sigma] \\
(\forall A)[\sigma] & = \forall A[\sigma] \\
(\lambda A. s)[\sigma] & = \lambda A[\sigma]. s[\sigma] \\
(s A)[\sigma] & = s[\sigma, \tau] A[\sigma] \\
(\Lambda. s)[\sigma] & = \Lambda. s[\sigma]
\end{align*}$$

For the terms we actually require a vector of two parallel substitutions, $\langle \sigma, \tau \rangle$, since both type and term variables can occur in a given term:

$$\begin{align*}
\text{xm}[\sigma, \tau] & = \tau \text{xm} \\
(st)[\sigma, \tau] & = s[\sigma, \tau] t[\sigma, \tau] \\
(\lambda A. s)[\sigma, \tau] & = \lambda A[\sigma]. s[\sigma][\tau] \\
(s A)[\sigma, \tau] & = s[\sigma, \tau] A[\sigma] \\
(\Lambda. s)[\sigma, \tau] & = \Lambda. s[\sigma][\tau]
\end{align*}$$

The key idea in both cases is that parallel substitutions act on all free variables at once, which leads to an elegant equational theory and subsequently to a good foundation for proof automation. A nice example is $\beta$-reduction, which can concisely be expressed as $$(\lambda A. s) t \leadsto s[\text{id}, t \cdot \text{id}].$$

The Autosubst framework is capable of generating all of this automatically from annotated inductive syntax definitions, together with the respective equational theories. It further provides a decision tactic that can solve goals involving substitution expressions, based on the results in [27].
B  HOAS Definitions

We give a brief overview of the definitions as they were used in the Abella and Beluga proofs. The HOAS specifications are identical for both systems. The two-sorted variant is given on the left, the PTS is on the right. We also include the types of the judgements.

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{Ty}_F, \text{Tm}_F : \text{Type} & \quad \text{Ty}_\lambda : \text{Type} \\
\_ \rightarrow \_ : \text{Ty}_F \rightarrow \text{Ty}_F \rightarrow \text{Ty}_F & \quad \_ : \text{Ty}_\lambda \rightarrow \text{Ty}_\lambda \rightarrow \text{Ty}_\lambda \\
\forall : \_ : (\text{Ty}_F \rightarrow \text{Ty}_F) \rightarrow \text{Ty}_F & \quad \Pi : _\_ : \text{Ty}_\lambda \rightarrow (\text{Ty}_\lambda \rightarrow \text{Ty}_\lambda) \rightarrow \text{Ty}_\lambda \\
\_ : \text{Tm}_F \rightarrow \text{Tm}_F \rightarrow \text{Tm}_F & \quad \_ : \text{Tm}_\lambda \rightarrow \text{Tm}_\lambda \rightarrow \text{Tm}_\lambda \\
\lambda : \_ : (\text{Tm}_F \rightarrow (\text{Tm}_F \rightarrow \text{Tm}_F)) \rightarrow \text{Tm}_F & \quad \lambda : _\_ : (\text{Tm}_\lambda \rightarrow (\text{Tm}_\lambda \rightarrow \text{Tm}_\lambda)) \rightarrow \text{Tm}_\lambda \\
\Lambda : \_ : (\text{Tm}_F \rightarrow \text{Tm}_F) \rightarrow \text{Tm}_F & \quad \Lambda : \_ : \text{Tm}_\lambda \rightarrow \text{Tm}_\lambda \rightarrow \text{Tm}_\lambda \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\_ \text{ty} : \text{Ty}_F \rightarrow \text{Prop} & \quad \_ \text{Prop} \\
\_ : \text{Tm}_F \rightarrow \text{Ty}_F \rightarrow \text{Prop} & \quad _\_ : \text{Tm}_\lambda \rightarrow \text{Tm}_\lambda \rightarrow \text{Prop} \\
\end{array}
\]

Note that Abella distinguishes the system sorts \text{Prop} and \text{Type}. Inductive derivations are only exposed for the former. In Beluga on the other hand, both are considered as basic LF types.

The four judgements/predicates are defined inductively, both in Abella and Beluga. The two PTS definitions are identical in both frameworks. The bold operators \(\Rightarrow\) and \(\Pi\) are used to construct hypothetical and locally quantified premises, respectively. Meta level application is denoted by \(_\_\).

\[
\begin{array}{llllllll}
\text{U} & \text{U} & a : \lambda \text{Prop} & b : \lambda \text{Prop} & a : \lambda \text{Prop} & \text{U} & a : \lambda \text{Prop} & \text{U}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{llllllll}
\text{U} & \text{U} & a : \lambda \text{Prop} & b : \lambda \text{Prop} & a : \lambda \text{Prop} & \text{U} & a : \lambda \text{Prop} & \text{U}
\end{array}
\]

With respect to the two-sorted system there is a difference between the Abella and the Beluga definitions, due to the differences in the respective meta theories. The Abella version is straightforward:

\[
\begin{array}{llllllllll}
\text{A} \text{ty} & \text{B} \text{ty} & \text{Π} \text{x} . \text{ty} \Rightarrow \text{A} (\text{ty}) & \text{Set} & \text{∀} \text{A} \text{ty} & \text{Π} \text{x} . \text{ty} \Rightarrow \text{A} (\text{ty}) & \text{Set} & \text{∀} \text{A} \text{ty} & \text{A} \text{ty} & \text{Set} & \text{∀} \text{A} \text{ty} & \text{A} \text{ty} & \text{Set} & \text{∀} \text{A} \text{ty} & \text{A} \text{ty} & \text{Set} & \text{∀} \text{A} \text{ty} & \text{A} \text{ty} & \text{Set} & \text{∀} \text{A} \text{ty} & \text{A} \text{ty} & \text{Set}
\end{array}
\]

In Beluga, on the other hand, contexts are first class, and thus well-scopedness of expressions is inherent. Hence the type formation judgement of the two-sorted system vanishes completely, which reduces the definition of the typing judgement to:

\[
\begin{array}{llllllllll}
\text{Set} & \text{Set} & \text{Set} & \text{Set} & \text{Set} & \text{Set} & \text{Set} & \text{Set} & \text{Set} & \text{Set} & \text{Set} & \text{Set} & \text{Set} & \text{Set} & \text{Set}
\end{array}
\]

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References


