An Analysis of Tennenbaum's Theorem in Constructive Type Theory

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Abstract

Tennenbaum's theorem states that the only countable model of Peano arithmetic (PA) with computable arithmetical operations is the standard model of natural numbers. In this paper, we use constructive type theory as a framework to revisit and generalize this result.

The chosen framework allows for a synthetic approach to computability theory, by exploiting the fact that, externally, all functions definable in constructive type theory can be shown computable. We internalize this fact by assuming a version of Church's thesis expressing that any function on natural numbers is representable by a formula in PA. This assumption allows for a conveniently abstract setup to carry out rigorous computability arguments and feasible mechanization.

Concretely, we constructivize several classical proofs and present one inherently constructive rendering of Tennenbaum's theorem, all following arguments from the literature. Concerning the classical proofs in particular, the constructive setting allows us to highlight differences in their assumptions and conclusions which are not visible classically. All versions are accompanied by a unified mechanization in the Coq proof assistant.

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1 Introduction

In classical logic, it is relatively straightforward to establish the existence of non-standard models of first-order Peano arithmetic (PA), showing that the theory does not possess a unique model up to isomorphism and is therefore not categorical. Following a typical textbook presentation [3], one way to construct a non-standard model is by adding a new constant symbol c to the language of PA together with the enumerable list of new axioms $c \neq 0$, $c \neq 1$, $c \neq 2$, etc. This yields a theory with the property that every finite subset of its axioms is satisfied by the standard model $\mathbb{N}$, since we can always give a large enough interpretation of the constant c in $\mathbb{N}$. Hence by the compactness theorem, the full theory has a model $\mathcal{M}$, which must then be non-standard, as the interpretation of c in $\mathcal{M}$ corresponds to an element which is larger then any number $n : \mathbb{N}$.

This construction comes with some striking consequences. Since PA can prove that for every bound n, the products of the form $\prod_{k \leq n} a_k$ exist, the presence of the non-standard element c in $\mathcal{M}$ gives rise to infinite products $\prod_{k \leq c} a_k$. The general PA model $\mathcal{M}$ can therefore exhibit behaviors disagreeing with the usual intuition that computations in PA are finitary, which are largely based on the familiarity with the standard model $\mathbb{N}$.

However, these intuitions are not too far off the mark, as was demonstrated by Stanley Tennenbaum [38] in a remarkable theorem: $\mathbb{N}$ is (up to isomorphism) the only *computable* model of first-order PA. Here, a model is considered *computable* if its elements can be

coded by numbers in $\mathbb{N}$, and the arithmetic operations on model elements can be realized by computable functions on these codes. Usually, this theorem is formulated in a classical framework such as ZF set theory and the precise meaning of *computable* is given by making reference to a concrete model of computation like Turing machines, μ-recursive functions, or the λ-calculus [14, 34]. But as is custom, the computability of a function is rarely proven by exhibiting an explicit construction in the chosen model, but by a call to the *Church-Turing thesis*, expressing that every function intuitively computable will be computable in the model.

To offer an alternative and more rigorous perspective, in this paper we revisit Tennenbaum's theorem in constructive type theory. Since we can externally observe that all functions of constructive type theory are computable, we have the freedom to simply treat every function as being computable, without exhibiting any internal representation in a formal model of computation. This is known as the *synthetic* approach to computability [31, 1] and simplifies computability arguments to the point where the above-mentioned intuitions usually suffice to give complete proofs with no formal gaps, and renders mechanization much more feasible.

This also leads to a simplification as it comes to the statement of Tennenbaum's theorem: In the most natural semantics interpreting the arithmetic operations with type-theoretic functions, simply *all* models are computable and we no longer need "computable model" as part of the theorem statement. We furthermore *internalize* computability by assuming a version of *Church's thesis* [18, 40, 7], an axiom which expresses that *all* functions $\mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ have a representation in an internally captured formalism, in our case PA. With this setup, all arguments involving a computability proof reduce to the constructions of type-theoretic functions, giving a formal counterpart to the informal appeal to the Church-Turing thesis.

Based on this framework, we follow the classical presentations of Tennenbaum's theorem [14, 34] to develop constructive versions only assuming a type-theoretic version of *Markov's principle* [21]. Classically, these proofs all yield the same version of Tennenbaum's theorem, but under a constructive lens, they differ in the strength of their respective assumptions and conclusions. This is then complemented by the adaption of an inherently constructive variant given by McCarty [23, 24].

Concretely, our contributions can be summarized as follows:

- We formulate, establish, and compare several versions of Tennenbaum's theorem in the setting of synthetic computability based on constructive type theory.
- We generalize Tennenbaum's theorem to models with decidable divisibility relation that need not be computable in general nor even enumerable (Corollary 42).
- We provide a Coq mechanization covering all results studied in this paper.[1]

To make the paper self-contained, we start out in Section 2 by giving a quick introduction to the essential features of constructive type theory, synthetic computability, and the type-theoretic specification of first-order logic. We continue with a presentation of the first-order axiomatization of PA as given in previous work [15], and of basic results about its standard and non-standard models in Section 4. These are then used in Section 5 to establish results that allow the encoding of predicates on $\mathbb{N}$ in non-standard models, which are essential in the proof of Tennenbaum's theorem. In Section 6 we introduce the chosen formulation of Church's thesis, which is then used to derive Tennenbaum's theorem in several variations in Section 7. We conclude in Section 8 with observations about these proofs and remarks on the Coq mechanization as well as related and future work.

[1] The only two facts with no formal counterpart in Coq are clearly marked as "Hypothesis" in Section 7.3. The full mechanization is accessible from the web page listed as supplementary material and systematically hyperlinked with the highlighted statements in the PDF version of this paper.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Constructive Type Theory

Our framework is the calculus of inductive constructions (CIC) [6, 27] which is implemented in the Coq proof assistant [37], providing a predicative hierarchy of *type universes* above a single impredicative universe $\mathbb{P}$ of *propositions* and the capability of inductive type definitions. On type level, we have the unit type $\mathbb{1}$ with a single element, the void type $\mathbb{0}$, function spaces $X \to Y$, products $X \times Y$, sums $X + Y$, dependent products[2] $\forall(x : X).\, A\,x$, and dependent sums $\Sigma(x : X).\, A\,x$. On the propositional level, the notions as listed in the order above, are denoted by the usual logical notation ($\top$, $\bot$, $\to$, $\wedge$, $\vee$, $\forall$, $\exists$).[3] It is important to note that the so-called *large eliminations* from the impredicative $\mathbb{P}$ into higher types of the hierarchy are restricted. In particular it is therefore generally not possible to show $(\exists x.\, p\,x) \to \Sigma x.\, p\,x$.[4] The restriction does however allow for large elimination of the equality predicate $= : \forall X.\, X \to X \to \mathbb{P}$, as well as function definitions by well-founded recursion.

We will also use the basic inductive types of *Booleans* ($\mathbb{B} := \mathsf{tt} \mid \mathsf{ff}$), *Peano natural numbers* ($n : \mathbb{N} := 0 \mid n + 1$), the *option type* ($\mathcal{O}(X) := {}^\circ x \mid \emptyset$) and *lists* ($l : \mathsf{List}(X) := [\,] \mid x :: l$). Furthermore, by X^n we denote the type of *vectors* $\vec{v}$ of length $n : \mathbb{N}$ over X.

▶ **Definition 1**. *A proposition $P : \mathbb{P}$ is called* definite *if $P \vee \neg P$ holds and* stable *if $\neg\neg P \to P$. The same terminology is used for predicates $p : X \to \mathbb{P}$ given they are pointwise definite or stable. We furthermore want to recall the following logical principles:*

$$\mathsf{LEM} := \forall P : \mathbb{P}.\, \mathsf{definite}\, P \qquad \textit{(Law of Excluded Middle)}$$

$$\mathsf{DNE} := \forall P : \mathbb{P}.\, \mathsf{stable}\, P \qquad \textit{(Double Negation Elimination)}$$

$$\mathsf{MP} := \forall f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}.\, \mathsf{stable}\, (\exists n.\, f n = 0) \qquad \textit{(Markov's Principle)}$$

all of which are not provable in CIC.

Note that LEM and DNE are equivalent while MP is much weaker and has a constructive interpretation [21]. For convenience, and as used for instance by Bauer [2], we adapt the reading of double negated statements like $\neg\neg P$ as "*potentially* P".[5]

▶ Remark (Handling $\neg\neg$). Given any propositions A, B we constructively have $(A \to \neg B) \leftrightarrow (\neg\neg A \to \neg B)$, telling us that whenever we are trying to prove a negated goal, we can remove double negations in front of any available assumption. More specifically then, any statement of the form $\neg\neg A_1 \to \ldots \to \neg\neg A_n \to \neg\neg C$, is equivalent to $A_1 \to \ldots \to A_n \to \neg\neg C$ and since $C \to \neg\neg C$ holds, it furthermore suffices to show $A_1 \to \ldots \to A_n \to C$ in this case. In the following, we will make use of these facts without further notice.

2.2 Synthetic Computability

As already expressed in Section 1, constructive type theory allows us to interpret all definable functions as computable. We then get simplified versions [9] of usual definitions:

[2] As is custom in Coq, we write $\forall$ in place of the symbol Π for dependent products.
[3] Negation $\neg A$ is used as an abbreviation for both $A \to \bot$ and $A \to \mathbb{0}$.
[4] The direction $(\Sigma x.\, p\,x) \to \exists x.\, p\,x$ is however always provable. Intuitively, one can think of $\exists x.\, p\,x$ as stating the mere existence of some value satisfying p, while $\Sigma x.\, p\,x$ is a type that also carries a value satisfying this.
[5] $\neg\neg P$ expresses the impossibility of P being wrong, so it represents a guarantee that P can potentially be shown correct.

▶ **Definition 2** (Enumerability). *Let $p : X \to \mathbb{P}$ be some predicate. We say that p is* enumerable *if there is an* enumerator $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathcal{O}(X)$ *such that* $\forall x{:}X.\, p\,x \leftrightarrow \exists n.\, f n = {}^{\circ}x$.

▶ **Definition 3** (Decidability). *Let $p : X \to \mathbb{P}$ be some predicate. We call $f : X \to \mathbb{B}$ a* decider *for p and write* $\mathsf{decider}\, p\, f$ *iff* $\forall x{:}X.\, p\,x \leftrightarrow f x = \mathsf{tt}$. *We then define the following notions of decidability:*

- $\mathsf{Dec}\, p := \exists f{:}X \to \mathbb{B}.\, \mathsf{decider}\, p\, f$
- $\mathsf{dec}(P{:}\mathbb{P}) := P + \neg P$.

In both cases we will often refer to the predicate or proposition simply as being decidable.

We also expand the synthetic vocabulary with notions for types. In the textbook setting, many of them can only be defined for sets which are in bijection with $\mathbb{N}$, but synthetically they can be handled in a more uniform way.

▶ **Definition 4**. *We call a type X*

- enumerable *if $\lambda x{:}X.\top$ is enumerable,*
- discrete *if there exists a decider for equality $=$ on X,*
- separated *if there exists a decider for apartness $\neq$ on X,*
- witnessing *if* $\forall f{:}X \to \mathbb{B}.\, (\exists x.\, f x = \mathsf{tt}) \to \Sigma x.\, f x = \mathsf{tt}$.

▶ **Fact 5**. *In the particular type theory we use, $\mathbb{N}$ is witnessing.*

2.3 First-Order Logic

In order to study Tennenbaum's theorem, we need to give a description of the first-order theory of PA and the associated intuitionistic theory of *Heyting arithmetic* (HA), which has the same axiomatization, but uses intuitionistic first-order logic. We follow prior work in [9, 10, 15] and describe first-order logic inside of the constructive type theory, by inductively defining formulas, terms, and the deduction system. We then define a semantics for this logic, which uses Tarski models and interprets formulas over the respective domain of the model. The type of natural numbers $\mathbb{N}$ will then naturally be a model of HA.

Before specializing to one particular theory, we keep the definition of first-order logic general and fix some arbitrary signature $\Sigma = (\mathcal{F}; \mathcal{P})$ for function and predicate symbols.

▶ **Definition 6** (Terms and Formulas). *We define terms $t{:}\mathsf{tm}$ and formulas $\varphi{:}\mathsf{fm}$ inductively.*

$$s, t{:}\mathsf{tm} ::= x_n \mid f\,\vec{v} \qquad (n{:}\mathbb{N},\ f{:}\mathcal{F},\ \vec{v}{:}\mathsf{tm}^{|f|})$$

$$\alpha, \beta{:}\mathsf{fm} ::= \bot \mid P\,\vec{v} \mid \alpha \to \beta \mid \alpha \wedge \beta \mid \alpha \vee \beta \mid \forall\, \alpha \mid \exists\, \beta \qquad (P{:}\mathcal{P},\ \vec{v}{:}\mathsf{tm}^{|P|}).$$

Where $|f|$ and $|P|$ are the arities of the function symbol f and predicate symbol P, respectively.

We use de Bruijn indexing to formalize the binding of variables to quantifiers. This means that the variable x_n at some position in a formula is *bound* to the n-th quantifier preceding this variable in the syntax tree of the formula. If there is no quantifier binding the variable, it is said to be *free*.

▶ **Definition 7** (Substitution). *Given a variable assignment $\sigma : \mathbb{N} \to \mathsf{tm}$ we recursively define* substitution *on terms by $x_k[\sigma] := \sigma\, k$ and $f\,\vec{v} := f(\vec{v}[\sigma])$, further extended to formulas by*

$$\bot[\sigma] := \bot \qquad (P\,\vec{v})[\sigma] := P\,(\vec{v}[\sigma]) \qquad (\alpha \mathbin{\dot{\square}} \beta)[\sigma] := \alpha[\sigma] \mathbin{\dot{\square}} \beta[\sigma] \qquad (\dot{\nabla}\,\varphi)[\sigma] := \dot{\nabla}(\varphi[x_0; \lambda x.(\sigma x)[\uparrow]])$$

where $\dot{\square}$ is any logical connective and $\dot{\nabla}$ any quantifier. The expression $x; \sigma$ is defined by $(x;\sigma)\,0 := x$ as well as $(x;\sigma)(n+1) := \sigma\, n$ and is simply appending x as the first element to $\sigma : \mathbb{N} \to \mathsf{tm}$. By $\uparrow$ we designate the substitution $\lambda n.\, x_{n+1}$ shifting all variable indices by one.

▶ **Definition 8** (Natural Deduction). *Natural deduction* $\vdash : (\mathsf{fm} \to \mathbb{P}) \to \mathsf{fm} \to \mathbb{P}$ *is characterized inductively by the usual rules (see Appendix A). We write* $\vdash$ *for intuitionistic natural deduction and* $\vdash_c$ *for the classical variant, extending* $\vdash$ *with Peirce's law* $((\varphi \to \psi) \to \varphi) \to \varphi$.

▶ **Definition 9** (Tarski Semantics). *A* model $\mathcal{M}$ *consists of a type* D *designating its domain together with functions* $f^{\mathcal{M}} : D^{|f|} \to D$ *and* $P^{\mathcal{M}} : D^{|P|} \to \mathbb{P}$ *for all symbols* f *in* $\mathcal{F}$ *and* P *in* $\mathcal{P}$. *We will also use* $\mathcal{M}$ *to refer to the domain. Functions* $\rho : \mathbb{N} \to \mathcal{M}$ *are called environments and are used as variable assignments to recursively give evaluations to terms:*

$$\hat{\rho}\, x_k := \rho\, k \qquad \hat{\rho}\,(f\,\vec{v}) := f^{\mathcal{M}}(\hat{\rho}\,\vec{v}) \qquad (v : \mathsf{tm}^n)$$

This interpretation is then extended to formulas via the satisfaction relation:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{M} \vDash_\rho P\,\vec{v} &:= P^{\mathcal{M}}(\hat{\rho}\,\vec{v}) & \mathcal{M} \vDash_\rho \alpha \to \beta &:= \mathcal{M} \vDash_\rho \alpha \to \mathcal{M} \vDash_\rho \beta \\ \mathcal{M} \vDash_\rho \alpha \wedge \beta &:= \mathcal{M} \vDash_\rho \alpha \wedge \mathcal{M} \vDash_\rho \beta & \mathcal{M} \vDash_\rho \alpha \vee \beta &:= \mathcal{M} \vDash_\rho \alpha \vee \mathcal{M} \vDash_\rho \beta \\ \mathcal{M} \vDash_\rho \forall \alpha &:= \forall x : D.\ \mathcal{M} \vDash_{x;\rho} \alpha & \mathcal{M} \vDash_\rho \exists \alpha &:= \exists x : D.\ \mathcal{M} \vDash_{x;\rho} \alpha \end{aligned}$$

We say that a formula φ holds in the model $\mathcal{M}$ *and write* $\mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi$ *if for every* ρ *we have* $\mathcal{M} \vDash_\rho \varphi$. *We extend this notation to theories* $\mathcal{T} : \mathsf{fm} \to \mathbb{P}$ *by writing* $\mathcal{M} \vDash \mathcal{T}$ *iff* $\forall \varphi.\, \mathcal{T}\,\varphi \to \mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi$ *and we write* $\mathcal{T} \vDash \varphi$ *if* $\mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi$ *for all models* $\mathcal{M}$ *with* $\mathcal{M} \vDash \mathcal{T}$.

▶ **Fact 10** (Soundness). *For any formula* φ *and theory* $\mathcal{T}$, *if* $\mathcal{T} \vdash \varphi$ *then* $\mathcal{T} \vDash \varphi$.

From the next section onwards, we will no longer explicitly write formulas with de Bruijn indices, but will use the conventional notation which uses named variables.

3 Axiomatization of Peano Arithmetic

We present PA following [15], as a first-order theory with a signature consisting of symbols for the constant zero, the successor function, addition, multiplication and equality:

$$\Sigma_{\mathsf{PA}} := (\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{PA}}; \mathcal{P}_{\mathsf{PA}}) = (0,\ S, +, \times; =)$$

The finite core of PA axioms consists of statements characterizing the successor function, as well as addition and multiplication:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Disjointness} &: \forall x.\, Sx = 0 \to \bot & \text{Injectivity} &: \forall xy.\, Sx = Sy \to x = y \\ +\text{-base} &: \forall x.\, 0 + x = x & +\text{-recursion} &: \forall xy.\, (Sx) + y = S(x + y) \\ \times\text{-base} &: \forall x.\, 0 \times x = 0 & \times\text{-recursion} &: \forall xy.\, (Sx) \times y = y + x \times y \end{aligned}$$

We then get the full (and infinite) axiomatization of PA with the axiom scheme of induction for unary formulas. In our meta-theory the schema is a type-theoretic function on formulas:

$$\lambda\varphi.\, \varphi[0] \to (\forall x.\, \varphi[x] \to \varphi[Sx]) \to \forall x.\, \varphi[x]$$

If instead of the induction scheme we add the axiom $\forall x.\, x = 0 \vee \exists y.\, x = Sy$, we get the theory Q known as *Robinson arithmetic*. Both PA and Q also contain axioms for equality:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Reflexivity} &: \forall x.\, x = x \\ \text{Symmetry} &: \forall xy.\, x = y \to y = x \\ \text{Transitivity} &: \forall xyz.\, x = y \to y = z \to x = z \\ S\text{-equality} &: \forall xy.\, x = y \to Sx = Sy \\ +\text{-equality} &: \forall xyuv.\, x = u \to y = v \to x + y = u + v \\ \times\text{-equality} &: \forall xyuv.\, x = u \to y = v \to x \times y = u \times v \end{aligned}$$

The classical first-order theory of Peano arithmetic is described by $\mathsf{PA} \vdash_c$, while its intuitionistic counterpart – Heyting arithmetic – is given by $\mathsf{PA} \vdash$.[6] Since the constructive type theory we have chosen to work in only gives us a model for Heyting arithmetic, we will only work with the intuitionistic theory $\mathsf{PA} \vdash$. To emphasize this we will from now on write HA instead of PA.

For simplicity, we only consider models that interpret the equality symbol with the actual equality relation of its domain, so-called *extensional* models. Note that in the Coq development we even make the equality symbol a syntactic primitive, therefore enabling the convenient behavior that the interpreted equality reduces to actual equality.

▶ **Definition 11**. *We recursively define a function* $\overline{\cdot} : \mathbb{N} \to \mathsf{tm}$ *by* $\overline{0} := 0$ *and* $\overline{n+1} := S\overline{n}$*, giving every natural number a representation as a term. Any term* t *which is of the form* $\overline{n}$ *will be called* numeral.

We furthermore use notations for expressing *less than* $x < y := \exists\, k.\, S(x+k) = y$, *less or equal* $x \leq y := \exists\, k.\, x + k = y$ and for *divisibility* $x \mid y := \exists\, k.\, x \times k = y$.

The formulas of HA can be classified in a hierarchy based on the their computational properties. We will only consider two levels of this hierarchy, namely Δ_1 and Σ_1 formulas:

▶ **Definition 12**. *A formula* φ *is* Δ_1 *if we have* $\mathsf{HA} \vdash \varphi \vee \neg\varphi$ *and if for every substitution* σ *such that* $\varphi[\sigma]$ *is closed we even have* $\mathsf{Q} \vdash \varphi[\sigma]$ *or* $\mathsf{Q} \vdash \neg\varphi[\sigma]$.

We call a formula $\exists_n$ *if it is of the form* $\exists \ldots \exists\, \varphi_0$*, where* φ_0 *is a* Δ_1 *formula preceded by exactly* n *existential quantifiers. If a formula is* $\exists_n$ *for some* n*, it is called* Σ_1.

Note that every $\exists_n$ formula can be proven equivalent to a $\exists_1$ formula by replacing the n quantifiers $\exists x_1 \ldots \exists x_n$ with $\exists x\, \exists x_1 < x \ldots \exists x_n < x$. A more syntactic definition of Δ_1 would characterize them as the formulas which are equivalent to both a Π_0 and Σ_0 formula. For our purposes the more semantic definition simply stipulating the necessary decidability properties is preferable, as it directly implies the absoluteness properties we will actually need:

▶ **Lemma 13** (Δ_1-Absoluteness). *Let* $\mathcal{M} \vDash \mathsf{HA}$ *and* φ *be any closed* Δ_1 *formula, then we have* $\mathbb{N} \vDash \varphi \leftrightarrow \mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi$.

Proof. By Definition 12 we have either $\mathsf{HA} \vdash \varphi$ or $\mathsf{HA} \vdash \neg\varphi$. Since $\mathbb{N} \vDash \varphi$ we must have $\mathsf{HA} \vdash \varphi$ and therefore $\mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi$ by soundness. ◀

▶ **Lemma 14** (Σ_1-Completeness). *For any unary* Δ_1 *formula* $\varphi(x)$ *we have* $\mathbb{N} \vDash \exists x.\, \varphi(x)$ *iff* $\mathsf{HA} \vdash \exists x.\, \varphi(x)$.

Proof. The assumption $\mathbb{N} \vDash \exists x.\, \varphi(x)$ gives us $n : \mathbb{N}$ with $\mathbb{N} \vDash \varphi(\overline{n})$. By Lemma 13 we then have $\mathsf{HA} \vdash \varphi(\overline{n})$, which in turn shows $\mathsf{HA} \vdash \exists x.\, \varphi(x)$. The converse follows by soundness. ◀

4 Standard and Non-standard Models of HA

From now on $\mathcal{M}$ will always designate a HA model. We will now see that there is a canonical way to embed $\mathbb{N}$ into any model of PA.

▶ **Fact 15**. *We recursively define a function* $\nu : \mathbb{N} \to \mathcal{M}$ *by* $\nu\, 0 := 0^{\mathcal{M}}$ *and* $\nu\,(n+1) := S^{\mathcal{M}}(\nu\ n)$*. We define the predicate* $\mathsf{std} := \lambda e.\, \exists n.\, \overline{n} = e$ *and refer to* e *as a* standard number *if* $\mathsf{std}\, e$ *and* non-standard *if* $\neg\, \mathsf{std}\, e$*. We then have*

[6] Another way to treat the distinction between classical and intuitionistic theories would be to add all instances of Peirce's law to the axioms of a theory, instead of building them into the deduction system.

1. $\hat{\rho}\,\overline{n} = \nu\, n$ *for any* $n : \mathbb{N}$ *and environment* $\rho : \mathbb{N} \to \mathcal{M}$.
2. ν *is an injective homomorphism and therefore an* embedding *of* $\mathbb{N}$ *into* $\mathcal{M}$.

We take both facts as a justification to abuse notation and also write $\overline{n}$ *for* $\nu\, n$.

Usually we would have to write $0^{\mathcal{M}}, S^{\mathcal{M}}, +^{\mathcal{M}}, \times^{\mathcal{M}}, =^{\mathcal{M}}$ for the interpretations of the respective symbols in a model $\mathcal{M}$. For better readability we will however take the freedom to overload the symbols $0, S, +, \cdot, =$ to also refer to these interpretations.

▶ **Definition 16**. $\mathcal{M}$ *is called a* standard model *if there is a bijective homomorphism* $\varphi : \mathbb{N} \to \mathcal{M}$. *We will accordingly write* $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathbb{N}$ *if this is the case.*

We can show that ν is essentially the only homomorphism from $\mathbb{N}$ to $\mathcal{M}$ we need to worry about, since it is unique up to functional extensionality:

▶ **Lemma 17**. *Let* $\varphi : \mathbb{N} \to \mathcal{M}$ *be a homomorphism, then* $\forall x : \mathbb{N}.\, \varphi\, x = \nu\, x$.

Proof. By induction on x and using the fact that both are homomorphisms. ◀

We now have two equivalent ways to express standardness of a model.

▶ **Lemma 18**. $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathbb{N}$ *iff* $\forall e : \mathcal{M}.\, \mathsf{std}\, e$.

Proof. Given $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathbb{N}$, there is an isomorphism $\varphi : \mathbb{N} \to \mathcal{M}$. Since φ is surjective, Lemma 17 implies that ν must also be surjective. For the converse: if ν is surjective, it is an isomorphism since it is injective by Fact 15. ◀

Having seen that every model contains a unique embedding of $\mathbb{N}$, one may wonder whether there is a formula φ which could define and pick out precisely the standard numbers in $\mathcal{M}$. Lemma 19 gives a negative answer to this question:

▶ **Lemma 19**. *There is a unary formula* $\varphi(x)$ *with* $\forall e : \mathcal{M}.\, \big(\mathsf{std}\, e \leftrightarrow \mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi(e)\big)$ *if and only if* $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathbb{N}$.

Proof. Given a formula φ with the stated property, we certainly have $\mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi(\overline{0})$ since $\overline{0}$ is a standard number, and clearly $\mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi(x) \implies \mathsf{std}\, x \implies \mathsf{std}\,(Sx) \implies \mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi(Sx)$. Thus by induction in the model, we have $\mathcal{M} \vDash \forall x.\, \varphi(x)$, which is equivalent to $\forall e : \mathcal{M}.\, \mathsf{std}\, e$. The converse implication holds by choosing the formula $x = x$. ◀

We now turn our attention to models which are not isomorphic to $\mathbb{N}$.

▶ **Fact 20**. *For any* $e : \mathcal{M}$, *we have* $\neg\, \mathsf{std}\, e$ *iff* $\forall n : \mathbb{N}.\ e > \overline{n}$.

▶ **Definition 21**. *Founded on the result of Fact 20 we write* $e > \mathbb{N}$ *iff* $\neg\, \mathsf{std}\, e$ *and call* $\mathcal{M}$

- non-standard *(written* $\mathcal{M} > \mathbb{N}$*) iff there is* $e : \mathcal{M}$ *such that* $e > \mathbb{N}$,
- not standard *(written* $\mathcal{M} \ngtr \mathbb{N}$*) iff* $\neg \mathcal{M} \cong \mathbb{N}$.

We will also write $e : \mathcal{M} > \mathbb{N}$ *to express the existence of a non-standard element* e *in* $\mathcal{M}$.

Of course we have $\mathcal{M} > \mathbb{N} \to \mathcal{M} \ngtr \mathbb{N}$, but the converse implication does not hold constructively in general, so the distinction of both notions becomes meaningful.

▶ **Lemma 22** (Overspill). *If* $\mathcal{M} \ngtr \mathbb{N}$ *and* $\varphi(x)$ *is unary with* $\mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi(\overline{n})$ *for every* $n : \mathbb{N}$, *then*

1. $\neg \big(\forall e : \mathcal{M}.\, \mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi(e) \to \mathsf{std}\, e\big)$
2. $\mathsf{stable}\ \mathsf{std} \to \neg\neg\, \exists\, e > \mathbb{N}.\, \mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi(e)$
3. $\mathsf{DNE} \to \exists\, e > \mathbb{N}.\, \mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi(e)$.

Proof. (1) Assuming $\forall e{:}\mathcal{M}.\ \mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi(e) \to \mathsf{std}\, e$ and combining it with our assumption that φ holds on all numerals, Lemma 19 implies $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathbb{N}$, giving us a contradiction. For (2) note that we constructively have that $\neg\exists e{:}\mathcal{M}.\ \neg\mathsf{std}\, e \wedge \mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi(e)$ implies $\forall e{:}\mathcal{M}.\ \mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi(e) \to \neg\neg\, \mathsf{std}\, e$, and by using the stability of std we therefore get a contradiction in the same way as in (1). Statement (3) immediately follows from (2). ◀

In Section 5 we will use Overspill to encode arbitrary predicates by non-standard elements.

5 Coding Finite and Infinite Predicates

There is a standard way in which finite sets of natural numbers can be encoded by a single natural number. This is readily established in $\mathbb{N}$ and can then be carried over with relative ease to any HA model. Overspill has interesting consequences when it comes to this encoding, as for models $\mathcal{M} \ncong \mathbb{N}$, it allows the potential encoding of any predicate $p : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{P}$.

For the natural number version of the encoding, we only need some injective function $\pi : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ whose image consists only of prime numbers.

▶ **Lemma 23** (Finite Coding in $\mathbb{N}$). *Given any predicate $p : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{P}$ and bound $n{:}\mathbb{N}$, we have*

$$\neg\neg\, \exists c{:}\mathbb{N}\ \forall u{:}\mathbb{N}.\big(u < n \to (p\, u \leftrightarrow \pi_u \mid c)\big) \wedge \big(\pi_u \mid c \to u < n\big)$$

i.e. up to the specified bound n, the code *c is divisible by the prime π_u iff p holds on $u{:}\mathbb{N}$. The second part of the conjunction assures that no primes bigger than π_n are present in the code. Note that if p is definite, we can drop the $\neg\neg$.*

Proof. We do a proof by induction on n. For $n = 0$ we can choose $c = 1$. For the induction step we first note that $\neg\neg(p\, n \vee \neg p\, n)$ is constructively provable and that the induction hypothesis as well as the goal come with double negations at the front. Using $p\, n \vee \neg p\, n$ we can now consider two cases. If $\neg p\, n$ we can simply take the code c given by the induction hypothesis. If $p\, n$, we set the new code to be $c \cdot \pi_n$. In both cases the separate parts of the conjunction are checked by making use of the fact that π is an injective prime function. ◀

▶ **Remark 24.** *To formulate the above result in a generic model $\mathcal{M} \vDash \mathsf{HA}$, we require an object level representation of the prime function π. For now we will simply assume that we have such a binary formula $\Pi(x, y)$ and defer the justification to Section 6.*

This now makes it possible to express "π_u divides c" by $\exists p.\ \Pi(u, p) \wedge p \mid c$, where we will abuse notation and simply write $\Pi(u) \mid c$ for this. With Π then, we can take the coding result established for $\mathbb{N}$ and use it to show a similar result in any model of HA.

▶ **Lemma 25** (Finite Coding in $\mathcal{M}$). *For any binary formula $\alpha(x, y)$ and $n{:}\mathbb{N}$ we have*

$$\mathcal{M} \vDash \forall b\, \neg\neg\, \exists c\, \forall u < \overline{n}.\ \alpha(u, b) \leftrightarrow \Pi(u) \mid c.$$

If $\mathcal{M} \vDash \alpha(\overline{u}, b)$ is definite for every $u{:}\mathbb{N}$, $b{:}\mathcal{M}$, we can drop the $\neg\neg$ in the above.

Proof. Let $b : \mathcal{M}$, then define the predicate $p := \lambda u : \mathbb{N}.\, \mathcal{M} \vDash \alpha(\overline{u}, b)$. Then Lemma 23 potentially gives us a code $a{:}\mathbb{N}$ for p up to the bound n. It now suffices to show that the actual existence of $a{:}\mathbb{N}$ already implies

$$\mathcal{M} \vDash \exists c\, \forall u < \overline{n}.\ \alpha(u, b) \leftrightarrow \Pi(u) \mid c.$$

And indeed, we can verify that $c = \overline{a}$ shows the existential claim: given $u : \mathcal{M}$ with $\mathcal{M} \vDash u < \overline{n}$ we can conclude that u must be a standard number $\overline{u}$. We then have the equivalences

$$\mathcal{M} \vDash \alpha(\overline{u}, b) \iff p\,u \iff \pi_u \mid a \iff \mathcal{M} \vDash \Pi(\overline{u}) \mid \overline{a}$$

since a codes p and Π represents π. ◀

▶ **Lemma 26** (Infinite Coding in $\mathcal{M}$). *If* std *is stable,* $\mathcal{M} \ncong \mathbb{N}$ *and* $\alpha(x)$ *a unary formula, we have*

$$\neg\neg\, \exists c : \mathcal{M}\ \forall u : \mathbb{N}.\ \ \mathcal{M} \vDash \alpha(\overline{u}) \leftrightarrow \Pi(\overline{u}) \mid c.$$

Proof. Using Lemma 25 for the present case where α is unary, we get

$$\mathcal{M} \vDash \neg\neg\, \exists\, c \forall\, u < \overline{n}.\ \alpha(u) \leftrightarrow \Pi(u) \mid c$$

for every $n : \mathbb{N}$, so by Lemma 22 (Overspill) we get

$$\begin{aligned} &\neg\neg\, \exists\, e > \mathbb{N}.\ \mathcal{M} \vDash \neg\neg\, \exists\, c \forall\, u < e.\ \alpha(u) \leftrightarrow \Pi(u) \mid c \\ \implies\ &\neg\neg\, \exists c : \mathcal{M}\, \forall u : \mathbb{N}.\ \mathcal{M} \vDash \alpha(\overline{u}) \leftrightarrow \Pi(\overline{u}) \mid c. \end{aligned}$$

Where we used that given $\forall u : \mathcal{M} < e.\,(\ldots)$ we can show $\forall u : \mathbb{N}.\,(\ldots)$, since we have $e > \mathbb{N}$ and therefore $\overline{u} < e$ for any $u : \mathbb{N}$ by Fact 20. ◀

▶ **Lemma 27**. *If* std *is stable,* $\mathcal{M} \ncong \mathbb{N}$ *and* $\mathcal{M} \vDash \alpha(\overline{u}, b)$ *is definite for every* $b : \mathcal{M}$, $u : \mathbb{N}$, *then we have*

$$\neg\neg\, \forall b : \mathcal{M}\ \exists c : \mathcal{M}\ \forall u : \mathbb{N}.\ \ \mathcal{M} \vDash \alpha(\overline{u}, b) \leftrightarrow \Pi(\overline{u}) \mid c.$$

Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 26, but we make use of the definiteness to get the stronger result out of Lemma 25 and then use Overspill to conclude. ◀

6 Church's Thesis for First-Order Arithmetic

Church's thesis (CT) [18, 40], states that every function $\mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ has a representation in a previously chosen, concrete model of computation. In the constructive type theory that we are working in, it is possible to consistently add CT as an axiom [42, 35, 8]. Given that we are treating computability in the context of HA, we choose a version of CT which uses a model of computation based on representing functions by formulas in the language of HA.

▶ **Axiom 1** (CT_Q). *For every function* $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ *there exists a binary* $\exists_1$ *formula* $\varphi_f(x, y)$ *such that for every* $n : \mathbb{N}$ *we have* $\mathsf{Q} \vdash \forall y.\, \varphi_f(\overline{n}, y) \leftrightarrow \overline{fn} = y$.

This formulation takes its justification from the standard result establishing the representability of μ-recursive functions by Σ_1 formulae in Q [33, 26], combined with the fact that existential quantifiers can be compressed as mentioned in Section 3, to get the desired $\exists_1$ formula. We can now apply CT_Q on the injective prime function π to immediately settle Remark 24:

▶ **Fact 28**. *There is a binary formula representing the injective prime function* π *in* Q.

Furthermore, we can use it to establish the representability of decidable and enumerable predicates in Q [30].

▶ **Definition 29**. *We call* $p : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{P}$ weakly representable *by* $\varphi_p(x)$ *if* $\forall n{:}\mathbb{N}.\, p\,n \leftrightarrow \mathsf{Q} \vdash \varphi_p(\overline{n})$, *and* strongly representable *if* $p\,n \to \mathsf{Q} \vdash \varphi_p(\overline{n})$ *and* $\neg p\,n \to \mathsf{Q} \vdash \neg\varphi_p(\overline{n})$ *for every* $n{:}\mathbb{N}$.

▶ **Lemma 30** (Representability Theorem (RT)). *Assume* CT_Q, *and let* $p : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{P}$ *be given.*

1. *If* p *is decidable, it is strongly representable by a unary* $\exists_1$ *formula.*
2. *If* p *is enumerable, it is weakly representable by a unary* $\exists_2$ *formula.*

Proof. If p is decidable, then there is a function $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ such that $\forall x{:}\mathbb{N}.\, p\,x \leftrightarrow fx = 0$ and by CT_Q there is a binary $\exists_1$ formula $\varphi_f(x, y)$ representing f. We then define $\varphi_p(x) := \varphi_f(x, \overline{0})$ and deduce

$$\begin{aligned} p\,n &\implies fn = 0 \implies \mathsf{Q} \vdash \overline{fn} = \overline{0} \implies \mathsf{Q} \vdash \varphi_f(\overline{n}, \overline{0}) \implies \mathsf{Q} \vdash \varphi_p(\overline{n}) \\ \neg p\,n &\implies fn \neq 0 \implies \mathsf{Q} \vdash \neg(\overline{fn} = \overline{0}) \implies \mathsf{Q} \vdash \neg\varphi_f(\overline{n}, \overline{0}) \implies \mathsf{Q} \vdash \neg\varphi_p(\overline{n}) \end{aligned}$$

which shows that p is strongly representable.

If p is enumerable, then there is $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ such that $\forall x : \mathbb{N}.\, p\,x \leftrightarrow \exists n.\, fn = x + 1$ and by CT_Q there is a binary $\exists_1$ formula $\varphi_f(x, y)$ representing f. We then define $\varphi_p(x) := \exists n.\, \varphi_f(n, Sx)$ giving us

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{Q} \vdash \varphi_p(\overline{x}) &\iff \mathsf{Q} \vdash \exists n.\, \varphi_f(n, S\overline{x}) \iff \exists n{:}\mathbb{N}.\, \mathsf{Q} \vdash \varphi_f(\overline{n}, S\overline{x}) \\ &\iff \exists n{:}\mathbb{N}.\, \mathsf{Q} \vdash \overline{fn} = S\overline{x} \iff \exists n{:}\mathbb{N}.\, fn = x + 1 \iff p\,x \end{aligned}$$

which shows that p is weakly representable by a $\exists_2$ formula. ◀

7 Tennenbaum's Theorem

We will now present several proofs of Tennenbaum's theorem, differing in the assumptions they make and the strength of their results. All of the proofs have in common that they start by the assumption $\mathcal{M} > \mathbb{N}$ to then make use of the coding lemma to encode a particular formula or predicate by an element of the model.

In Section 7.1 we will assume enumerability of the model, enabling a direct diagonal argument. This proof idea can be found in [3]. In Section 7.2 we look at the proof approach that is most prominently found in the literature [34, 14] and uses the existence of recursively inseparable sets. We sharpen this approach to a generalization only relying on decidability of the divisibility relation of the model.

Another variant of the usual proof was proposed in [20] and circumvents the usage of Overspill. In our constructive setting, this leads to a perceivable difference when it comes to the strength of the result. Lastly we look at the consequences of Tennenbaum's theorem, once the underlying semantics is made explicitly constructive. The latter two variations are discussed in Section 7.3.

7.1 Via a Diagonal Argument

We start by noting that every HA model can prove the most basic fact about divisibility.

▶ **Lemma 31** (Euclidean Lemma). *Given* $e, d{:}\mathcal{M}$ *we have*

$$\mathcal{M} \vDash \exists r\, q.\, e = q \cdot d + r \;\wedge\; (0 < d \to r < d)$$

and the uniqueness property telling us that if $r_1, r_2 < d$ *then* $q_1 \cdot d + r_1 = q_2 \cdot d + r_2$ *implies* $q_1 = q_2$ *and* $r_1 = r_2$.

Proof. For Euclid's lemma, there is a standard proof by induction on $e : \mathcal{M}$. The uniqueness claim requires some basic results about the order relation $<$. ◀

▶ **Lemma 32.** *If $\mathcal{M}$ is enumerable and discrete, then $\lambda nd.\, \mathcal{M} \vDash \overline{n} \mid d$ has a decider.*

Proof. Let $n : \mathbb{N}$ and $d : \mathcal{M}$ be given. By the Euclidean Lemma 31 we have $\exists q, r : \mathcal{M}.\, e = q \cdot d + r$. This existence is propositional, so presently we cannot use it to give a decision for $e \mid d$. Since $\mathcal{M}$ is enumerable, there is a surjective function $g : \mathbb{N} \to \mathcal{M}$ and the above existence therefore shows $\exists q, r : \mathbb{N}.\, e = (g\, q) \cdot d + (g\, r)$. Since equality is decidable in $\mathcal{M}$ and $\mathbb{N}^2$ is witnessing, we get $\Sigma q, r : \mathbb{N}.\, e = (g\, q) \cdot d + (g\, r)$, giving us computational access to r, now allowing us to construct the decision. By the uniqueness part of Lemma 31 we have $g\, r = 0 \leftrightarrow e \mid d$, so the decidability of $e \mid d$ is entailed by the decidability of $g\, r = 0$. ◀

▶ **Lemma 33.** **1.** *If* std *is stable, then so is $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathbb{N}$.*
2. *Assuming* MP *and discreteness of $\mathcal{M}$, then* std *is stable.*

Proof. The first statement is trivial by Lemma 18. For the second, recall that $\mathsf{std}\, e$ stands for $\exists n : \mathbb{N}.\, \overline{n} = e$. Since $\overline{n} = e$ in $\mathcal{M}$ is decidable, stability follows from Fact 5. ◀

▶ **Lemma 34.** *If* std *is stable, $\mathcal{M} \ncong \mathbb{N}$, and $p : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{P}$ decidable, then potentially there is a code $c : \mathcal{M}$ such that $\forall n : \mathbb{N}.\, p\, n \leftrightarrow \mathcal{M} \vDash \overline{\pi_n} \mid c$.*

Proof. By RT, there is a formula φ_p strongly representing p. Under the given assumptions, we can use the coding Lemma 26, yielding a code $c : \mathcal{M}$ for φ_p, such that $\forall u : \mathbb{N}.\, \mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi_p(\overline{u}) \leftrightarrow \Pi(\overline{u}) \mid c$. Overall this shows:

$$p\, n \implies \mathsf{Q} \vdash \varphi_p(\overline{n}) \implies \mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi_p(\overline{n}) \implies \mathcal{M} \vDash \Pi(\overline{n}) \mid c$$
$$\neg p\, n \implies \mathsf{Q} \vdash \neg\, \varphi_p(\overline{n}) \implies \neg\, \mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi_p(\overline{n}) \implies \neg\, \mathcal{M} \vDash \Pi(\overline{n}) \mid c.$$

Since p is decidable, the latter implication entails $\mathcal{M} \vDash \Pi(\overline{n}) \mid c \implies p\, n$, which overall shows the desired equivalence. ◀

This gives us the following version of Tennenbaum's theorem:

▶ **Theorem 35.** *Assuming* MP*, if $\mathcal{M}$ is enumerable and discrete, then $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathbb{N}$.*

Proof. By Lemma 33 it suffices to show $\neg\neg \mathcal{M} \cong \mathbb{N}$. So assume $\mathcal{M} \ncong \mathbb{N}$ and try to derive $\bot$. Given the enumerability, there is a surjective function $g : \mathbb{N} \to \mathcal{M}$. We use this to define the predicate $p := \lambda n : \mathbb{N}.\, \neg\, \mathcal{M} \vDash \overline{\pi_n} \mid g\, n$, which is decidable by Lemma 32. By Lemma 34 and surjectivity of g then, there is some $c : \mathbb{N}$, such that $\neg\, \mathcal{M} \vDash \overline{\pi_c} \mid g\, c \overset{\text{def.}}{\iff} p\, c \overset{34}{\iff} \mathcal{M} \vDash \overline{\pi_c} \mid g\, c$ which gives the desired contradiction. ◀

7.2 Via Inseparable Predicates

The usual proof of Tennenbaum's theorem [14, 34] uses the existence of recursively inseparable sets and non-standard coding to establish the existence of a non-recursive set. In this situation, if we then were to again assume enumerability and discreteness of $\mathcal{M}$, we could easily reach the same conclusion as in Theorem 35. In the following however, we want to highlight that the proof which uses inseparable sets allows for a characterization of $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathbb{N}$ which only makes reference to the decidability of divisibility by numerals:

▶ **Definition 36.** *For $d : \mathcal{M}$ define the predicate $\dot{\neg} \mid d := \lambda n : \mathbb{N}.\, \mathcal{M} \vDash \overline{n} \mid d$.*

So in particular, in the following we will not assume enumerability or discreteness of $\mathcal{M}$.

▶ **Definition 37**. *A pair* $A, B : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{P}$ *of predicates is called* inseparable *iff*

1. *they are disjoint, meaning* $\forall n{:}\mathbb{N}.\, \neg(A\, n \wedge B\, n)$
2. *there is no decidable* $D : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{P}$ *which includes* A *i.e.* $\forall n{:}\mathbb{N}.\, A\, n \to D\, n$ *and is disjoint from* B *i.e.* $\forall n{:}\mathbb{N}.\, \neg(B\, n \wedge D\, n)$.

▶ **Lemma 38**. *There are inseparable enumerable predicates* $A, B : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{P}$.

Proof. We use an enumeration Φ_n : fm of formulas to define disjoint predicates $A := \lambda n{:}\mathbb{N}.\, \mathsf{Q} \vdash \neg\, \Phi_n(\overline{n})$ and $B := \lambda n{:}\mathbb{N}.\, \mathsf{Q} \vdash \Phi_n(\overline{n})$. Since proofs over Q can be enumerated, A and B are enumerable. Assume we are given a decidable predicate D which includes A and is disjoint from B. Using RT and the enumeration, there is $d{:}\mathbb{N}$ such that Φ_d strongly represents D. This gives us $D\, d \implies \mathsf{Q} \vdash \Phi_d(\overline{d}) \implies B\, d$, contradicting the disjointness of B and D, therefore showing $\neg D\, d$. Furthermore, representability gives us $\neg D\, d \implies \mathsf{Q} \vdash \neg\Phi_d(\overline{d}) \implies A\, d$ and since A is included in D, this shows $\neg D\, d \implies D\, d$. Overall this gives us a contradiction. ◀

▶ **Corollary 39**. *There is a pair* $\alpha(z), \beta(z)$ *of unary* $\exists_2$ *formulas such that* $A := \lambda n{:}\mathbb{N}.\, \mathsf{Q} \vdash \alpha(\overline{n})$ *and* $B := \lambda n{:}\mathbb{N}.\, \mathsf{Q} \vdash \beta(\overline{n})$ *are inseparable and enumerable.*

Proof. We get the desired formulas by using the weak representability of Lemma 30 on the predicates given by Lemma 38. ◀

▶ **Lemma 40**. *Assuming stability of* std *and* $\mathcal{M} \ncong \mathbb{N}$*, then* $\neg\neg\, \exists d{:}\mathcal{M}.\, \neg\mathsf{Dec}(\dot{\neg} \mid d)$.

Proof. By Corollary 39 there are inseparable formulas $\exists x, y.\, \alpha_0(x, y, z)$ and $\exists x, y.\, \beta_0(x, y, \overline{n})$ such that α_0, β_0 are Δ_1. Since they are disjoint, we have:

$$\mathbb{N} \vDash \forall\, x\, y\, u\, v\, z < \overline{n}.\, \neg(\alpha_0(x, y, z) \wedge \beta_0(u, v, z))$$

for every bound $n{:}\mathbb{N}$. By Lemma 13 we then get

$$\mathcal{M} \vDash \forall\, x\, y\, u\, v\, z < \overline{n}.\, \neg(\alpha_0(x, y, z) \wedge \beta_0(u, v, z))$$

and using Overspill we therefore potentially have $e{:}\mathcal{M}$ with

$$\mathcal{M} \vDash \forall\, x\, y\, u\, v\, z < e.\, \neg(\alpha_0(x, y, z) \wedge \beta_0(u, v, z))$$

showing the disjointness of α_0, β_0 when everything is bounded by e. We now define the predicate $X := \lambda n{:}\mathbb{N}.\, \mathcal{M} \vDash \exists\, x, y < e.\, \alpha_0(x, y, \overline{n})$ and note that

- If $\mathsf{Q} \vdash \exists\, x, y.\, \alpha_0(x, y, \overline{n})$ there are $m_1, m_2{:}\mathbb{N}$ with $\mathbb{N} \vDash \alpha_0(\overline{m_1}, \overline{m_2}, \overline{n})$ and $\mathcal{M} \vDash \alpha_0(\overline{m_1}, \overline{m_2}, \overline{n})$ by Lemma 13. We therefore get $X n$.
- Assume that $X n \wedge \mathsf{Q} \vdash \exists\, x, y.\, \beta_0(x, y, \overline{n})$. Then similarly to above, there are $m_1, m_2{:}\mathbb{N}$ with $\mathcal{M} \vDash \beta_0(\overline{m_1}, \overline{m_2}, \overline{n})$, showing $\mathcal{M} \vDash \exists\, x, y < e.\, \beta_0(x, y, \overline{n})$. Together with $X n$ this contradicts the disjointness of α_0, β_0 under the bound e.

Due to the inseparability of the given formulas, this shows that X cannot be decidable and by Lemma 27 there is now potentially a code $d{:}\mathcal{M}$ with $X n \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{M} \vDash \overline{\pi_n} \mid d$. ◀

▶ **Fact 41**. *For every* $e{:}\mathcal{M}$ *we have* $\mathsf{std}\, e \to \mathsf{Dec}(\dot{\neg} \mid e)$.

▶ **Corollary 42**. *Given* MP *and discrete* $\mathcal{M}$*, we have* $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathbb{N}$ *iff* $\forall d{:}\mathcal{M}.\, \neg\neg\mathsf{Dec}(\dot{\neg} \mid d)$.

Proof. The first implication follows by Fact 41. For the converse, note that the contraposition of Lemma 40 shows $\forall d{:}\mathcal{M}.\, \neg\neg\mathsf{Dec}(\dot{\neg} \mid d) \to \neg\neg\mathcal{M} \cong \mathbb{N}$ where the conclusion is equivalent to $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathbb{N}$ due to Lemma 33. ◀

7.3 Variants of the Theorem

We now investigate two further variants of the theorem, by making two further assumptions: the existence of formulas which satisfy a stronger notion of inseparability and that the coding lemma can be proven inside of HA.

▶ **Definition 43**. *Two formulas* $\alpha(x), \beta(x)$ *are called* HA-inseparable *if* $\lambda n{:}\mathbb{N}.\, \mathsf{Q} \vdash \alpha(\overline{n})$ *and* $\lambda n{:}\mathbb{N}.\, \mathsf{Q} \vdash \beta(\overline{n})$ *are inseparable and one can also show* $\mathsf{HA} \vdash \neg\exists\, x.\, \alpha(x) \land \beta(x)$.

▶ **Hypothesis 1**. *There are* Δ_1 *formulas* α_0, β_0 *such that* $\exists z.\, \alpha_0(z,x)$ *and* $\exists z.\, \beta_0(z,x)$ *are* HA*-inseparable.*

▶ **Hypothesis 2**. *For any binary* Δ_1 *formula* $\varphi(x,y)$, HA *can prove the following coding lemma:* $\mathsf{HA} \vdash \forall\, n\, b\, \exists\, c\, \forall\, u < n.\ (\exists z < b.\, \varphi(z,u)) \leftrightarrow \Pi(u) \mid c$.

According to [24], one way of establishing Hypothesis 1 is by taking the construction of inseparable formulas as seen earlier, and internalizing the given proof within HA. Similarly, Hypothesis 2 is justified by noting that its proof should be an internalized version of the proof of Lemma 23.

The following variant of Tennenbaum's theorem is based on an observation by Makholm [20]. Most importantly, it avoids the usage of Overspill, by using Hypothesis 2. In contrast to the result in Section 7.1 we want to highlight that the next theorem does not presuppose MP or the stability of std.

▶ **Theorem 44** (Makholm). *We have* $\mathcal{M} > \mathbb{N}$ *if and only if* $\exists d{:}\mathcal{M}.\neg\mathsf{Dec}(\dot{\top} \mid d)$.

Proof. First note that the converse follows from Fact 41. Now assume we have $e{:}\mathcal{M} > \mathbb{N}$. By Hypothesis 1 there are HA-inseparable $\exists_1$ formulas $\exists z.\, \alpha_0(z,x)$ and $\exists z.\, \beta_0(z,x)$, where α_0, β_0 are binary Δ_1 formulas. Then let $X := \lambda n{:}\mathbb{N}.\, \mathcal{M} \vDash \exists\, z < e.\, \alpha_0(z, \overline{n})$.

- If $\mathsf{Q} \vdash \exists\, z.\, \alpha_0(z,\overline{n})$ there is $m{:}\mathbb{N}$ with $\mathbb{N} \vDash \alpha_0(\overline{m},\overline{n})$ and $\mathcal{M} \vDash \alpha_0(\overline{m},\overline{n})$ by Lemma 13. We therefore get Xn.
- Assuming $Xn \land \mathsf{Q} \vdash \exists\, z.\, \beta_0(z,\overline{n})$, then similarly to above, there is $m{:}\mathbb{N}$ with $\mathcal{M} \vDash \beta_0(\overline{m},\overline{n})$, showing $\mathcal{M} \vDash \exists\, z < e.\, \beta_0(z,\overline{m})$. But together with Xn this contradicts the deductive disjointness property of the HA-inseparable formulas α_0 and β_0.

Due to the inseparability of the given $\exists_1$ formulas, this shows that X is not decidable. Using soundness on Hypothesis 2 for $\varphi := \alpha_0$ and $n, b := e$, we get

$$\mathcal{M} \vDash \exists\, c\, \forall\, u < e.\, \big(\exists\, z < e.\, \alpha_0(z,u)\big) \leftrightarrow \Pi(u) \mid c.$$

So there is a code $c{:}\mathcal{M}$ such that X is coded by it, showing that $\dot{\top} \mid c$ cannot be decidable. ◀

▶ **Corollary 45**. *We have* $\forall e{:}\mathcal{M}.\neg\neg\,\mathsf{std}\, e$ *iff* $\forall d{:}\mathcal{M}.\neg\neg\mathsf{Dec}(\dot{\top} \mid d)$.

McCarty [24, 23] considered Tennenbaum's theorem with constructive semantics. Instead of models placed in classical set theory, he assumes an intuitionistic theory (e.g. IZF), making the interpretation of the object-level disjunction much stronger. We simulate this in our type theory by assuming the following choice principle:

▶ **Definition 46**. *By* AUC *we denote the principle of unique choice:*

$$\forall X\, Y\, R.\, (\forall x\, \exists! y.\, Rxy) \to \exists f{:}X \to Y.\, \forall x.\, Rx(fx)$$

Note that CT and AUC combined prove the negation of LEM [7]. In the following, we are therefore (deliberately) anti-classical.

▶ **Lemma 47**. *For any formula* $\varphi(x,y)$ *we have* $\mathcal{M} \vDash \forall\, b.\, \neg\neg \forall\, x, y < b.\, \varphi(x,y) \vee \neg\varphi(x,y)$.

Proof. Single instances of the law of excluded middle are provable under double negation. We can then use this in combination with an induction on the bound b to prove the claim. ◀

▶ **Lemma 48**. *Assuming* AUC *and* $\mathcal{M} > \mathbb{N}$, *we have* $\forall d : \mathcal{M}. \neg\neg \mathsf{Dec}(\dot{\neg} \mid d)$.

Proof. Let $d : \mathcal{M}$ be given and assume $e : \mathcal{M} > \mathbb{N}$. Then we have $e + d + 1 > \mathbb{N}$ and using Lemma 47 we get

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathcal{M} \vDash \forall\, b.\, \neg\neg \forall\, x, y < b.\, \varphi(x,y) \vee \neg\varphi(x,y) \\ \Longrightarrow\ & \neg\neg\, \mathcal{M} \vDash \forall\, x, y < (e + d + 1).\ \varphi(x,y) \vee \neg\varphi(x,y) \\ \Longrightarrow\ & \neg\neg\, \forall n : \mathbb{N}.\, \mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi(\overline{n}, d) \vee \neg\varphi(\overline{n}, d) \\ \Longrightarrow\ & \neg\neg\, \forall n : \mathbb{N}.\, \mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi(\overline{n}, d) + \neg\, \mathcal{M} \vDash \varphi(\overline{n}, d) \end{aligned}$$

where the last implication is possible, since AUC implies the decidability of definite propositions. For the choice $\varphi(x,y) := x \mid y$ we then get the desired result. ◀

▶ **Corollary 49**. *Assuming* AUC, *then there are no non-standard models.*

Proof. Given $\mathcal{M} > \mathbb{N}$, Lemma 48 entails $\neg\exists d : \mathcal{M}. \neg\mathsf{Dec}(\dot{\neg} \mid d)$, in contradiction to Theorem 44. ◀

Still assuming both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 we can then derive:

▶ **Corollary 50** (McCarty). *Given* AUC *and* MP, HA *is categorical.*

Proof. Given that $\mathsf{HA} \vdash \forall xy.\, x = y \vee \neg\, x = y$, AUC entails that every model $\mathcal{M} \vDash \mathsf{HA}$ is discrete, showing the stability of std by Lemma 33. Combined with Corollary 49 this shows $\mathcal{M} \cong \mathbb{N}$. ◀

8 Discussion

8.1 General Remarks

In Section 7, we presented several proofs of Tennenbaum's theorem which we summarize in the below table, listing their assumptions[7] on the left and the conclusion on the right.

MP	AUC	discrete	HA-insep.	Conclusion	from
•		•		$\mathbb{N} \cong \mathcal{M}$ iff $\mathcal{M}$ enumerable	Theorem 35
•		•		$\mathcal{M} > \mathbb{N} \to \neg\neg\exists d. \neg\mathsf{Dec}(\dot{\neg} \mid d)$	Lemma 40
			•	$\mathcal{M} > \mathbb{N} \leftrightarrow \quad \exists d. \neg\mathsf{Dec}(\dot{\neg} \mid d)$	Theorem 44
•	•		•	$\mathbb{N} \cong \mathcal{M}$	Corollary 50

First note that since HA can show definiteness of equality, the above listed assumption of the model $\mathcal{M}$ being discrete is equivalent to $\mathcal{M}$ being separated.

Comparing Theorem 44 to Theorem 35 and Lemma 40 we see that its conclusion is constructively stronger. The noteworthy observation about Theorem 44 is that it cannot be reached by the proofs given in Section 7.2, as they crucially depend on Overspill and

[7] We do not list the global assumption CT_Q. Both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are provable but left unmechanized in Coq, we only list the former to highlight where it was used.

therefore MP and discreteness. The result only becomes possible once we use a stronger notion of inseparability for formulas and avoid the usage of Overspill.

As was pointed out by McCarty in [24], a weaker version WCT of CT suffices for his proof, where the code representing a given function is hidden behind a double negation. He mentions in [25] that WCT is still consistent with the Fan theorem, while CT is not. Analogously, the following weakening of CT_Q suffices for all of the proofs that we have presented:

▶ **Definition 51** (WCT_Q). *For every function* $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ *there* potentially *is a binary* $\exists_1$ *formula* $\varphi_f(x, y)$ *such that for every* $n{:}\mathbb{N}$ *we have* $\mathsf{Q} \vdash \forall y.\, \varphi_f(\overline{n}, y) \leftrightarrow \overline{fn} = y$.

This only needs few changes of the presented proofs and we verified this in the Coq project.[8] An advantage of WCT_Q over CT_Q is that the former follows from the double negation of the latter and is therefore negative, ensuring that its assumption does not block computation [5].

Depending on the fragment of first-order logic one can give constructive proofs of the model existence theorem [10], producing a countable syntactic model with computable functions for every consistent theory. By the argument given in the introduction, model existence would yield a countable and computable non-standard model of PA, which at first glance seems to contradict the statement of Tennenbaum's theorem. For any countable non-standard model of PA however, Theorem 44 and Lemma 32 entail that neither equality nor apartness can be decidable. This is similar in spirit to the results in [36], showing that even if the functions of the model are computable, non-computable behavior still emerges, but in relation to equality.

8.2 Coq Mechanization

The Coq development is axiom-free and the usage of crucial but constructively justified axioms CT_Q and MP are localized in the relevant sections. Apart from these, there are the two facts in Section 7.3 we have labeled as hypotheses, and which were taken as additional assumptions in the relevant sections. They are expected to be provable and would on paper usually be treated as facts and simply used, but since our treatment is backed up by a mechanization, we prefer to make these assumptions very explicit in the accompanying text.

In total, the development counts roughly 5400 lines of code. From those, 3000 loc on the specification of first-order logic and basic results about PA models were reused from earlier work [9, 10, 16, 15]. Notably, the formalization of the various coding lemmas from Section 5 took 460 loc and all variants of Tennenbaum's theorem come to a total of only 860 lines.

In contrast to the previous developments, where equality was treated as a relation symbol, we decided to treat equality as a primitive of the syntax. This is chosen as a mere simplification to ease working in an abstract model and is expected to be straightforward to eliminate.

8.3 Related Work

Presentations of first-order logic in the context of proof-checking have already been discussed and used, among others, by Shankar [32], Paulson [28], O'Connor [26], as well as Han and van Doorn [12]. The particular mechanization of first-order logic we use is based on several previous projects [9, 10, 16, 15] and part of the Coq library of undecidability proofs [11].

[8] We could have presented all of the results with respect to WCT_Q. We opted against this in favor of CT_Q, to avoid additional handling of double negations and to keep the proofs more readable.

Classical proofs of Tennenbaum's theorem can be found in [3, 34, 14]. There are also refinements of the theorem which show that computability of either operation suffices [22] as well as a weaker induction scheme [41, 4]. Constructive accounts were given by McCarty [23, 24] and Plisko [29], and a relatively recent investigation into Tennenbaum phenomena was conducted by Godziszewski and Hamkins [36].

Synthetic computability theory was introduced by Richman and Bauer [31, 1] and initially applied to constructive type theory by Forster, Kirst, and Smolka [9]. Their synthetic approach to undecidability results has been used in several other projects, all merged into the Coq library of undecidability proofs [11].

For an account of CT as an axiom in constructive mathematics we refer to Kreisel [18] and Troelstra [39]. Investigations into CT and its connections to other axioms of synthetic computability based on constructive type theory were done by Forster [7, 8].

8.4 Future Work

We would like to give a proper formalization of the arithmetical hierarchy, in particular implementing our semantic treatment of Δ_1 formulas with a syntactic restriction to formulas with bounded quantification. For a suitable definition, it could then also be shown that every Σ_1 formula is $\exists_1$, making the treatment of CT_Q and RT more uniform. A definition of the full hierarchy would allow us to conduct an analysis concerning the arithmetical strength of the induction scheme needed to establish Tennenbaum's theorem.

We would like to further justify CT_Q by starting off with the more conventional formulation of CT for some canonical model of computation, as for instance stated in [7], and verifying that it yields CT_Q. This should be in reach by connecting the mechanization of the DPRM theorem, given by Larchey-Wendling and Forster [19], with its reduction to Q, given by Kirst and Hermes [15].

We plan to mechanize the facts left informal in Section 7.3, namely Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. As these require sizeable syntactic derivations inside of HA but are not so central for the main result, we decided to avoid the necessary cumbersome manipulations in Coq. Their mechanization could possibly benefit from the proof mode developed in [13].

A more satisfying rendering of McCarty's result will be achieved by changing Definition 9, putting the interpretations of formulas on the (proof-relevant) type level instead of the propositional level, therefore removing the need to assume AUC to break the barrier from the propositional to the type level.

Following usual practice in textbooks, in Coq we consider equality a syntactic primitive and only regard models interpreting it as actual equality. When treated as axiomatized relation instead, we could consider the (slightly harder to work with) setoid models and obtain the more general result that no computable non-standard setoid model exists.

The presented versions of Tennenbaum's theorem do not explicitly mention the computability of addition or multiplication of the model, and as mentioned in Section 1 this is due to the chosen synthetic approach. To make these assumptions explicit again, we could assume an abstract version of CT which makes reference to a T predicate [17, 7], and expresses that every T-computable function is representable in Q. We can then then distinguish between addition or multiplication being T-computable and formalize the result that T-computability of either operation leads to the model being standard [22].

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A Deduction Systems

Intuitionistic natural deduction $\vdash : \mathsf{List}(\mathsf{fm}) \to \mathsf{fm} \to \mathbb{P}$ is defined inductively by the rules

$$\frac{\varphi \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \bot}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi} \qquad \frac{\Gamma, \varphi \vdash \psi}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \to \psi} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \to \psi \quad \Gamma \vdash \varphi}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \quad \Gamma \vdash \psi}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi}{\Gamma \vdash \psi}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \vee \psi} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \psi}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \vee \psi} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \vee \psi \quad \Gamma, \varphi \vdash \theta \quad \Gamma, \psi \vdash \theta}{\Gamma \vdash \theta}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma[\uparrow] \vdash \varphi}{\Gamma \vdash \forall \varphi} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \forall \varphi}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi[t]} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi[t]}{\Gamma \vdash \exists \varphi} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \exists \varphi \quad \Gamma[\uparrow], \varphi \vdash \psi[\uparrow]}{\Gamma \vdash \psi}$$

where we get the classical variant $\vdash_c$ by adding Peirce's rule as an axiom:

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash_c ((\varphi \to \psi) \to \varphi) \to \varphi}$$

The deduction systems lift to possibly infinite contexts $\mathcal{T} : \mathsf{fm} \to \mathbb{P}$ by writing $\mathcal{T} \vdash \varphi$ if there is a finite $\Gamma \subseteq \mathcal{T}$ with $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$.