Mechanised Metamathematics

An Investigation of First-Order Logic and Set Theory in Constructive Type Theory

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Slogans and Images

What is Mathematics?



https://msutexas.edu/academics/scienceandmath/mathematics/_assets/images/mathematics_image.jpg

Example: "There are infinitely many prime numbers"

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What is Metamathematics?



https://1000logos.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/logo-Meta.png

"The proposition 'there are infinitely many prime numbers' is provable in number theory"

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What is First-Order Logic?



https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4a/Emblem_of_the_First_Order.svg/888px-Emblem_of_the_First_Order.svg.png

Universal language consisting of a formal syntax, semantics, and deduction system

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What is Set Theory?



https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6d/Venn_A_intersect_B.svg/1200px-Venn_A_intersect_B.svg.png

Foundational first-order axiom system that can express all of mathematics

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What is Type Theory?



https://http2.mlstatic.com/D_NQ_NP_2X_731038-MLM47969124431_102021-F.jpg

An alternative foundation emphasising structure and interrelations of objects

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What is Constructive Logic?



https://img.redbull.com/images/c_limit,w_1500,h_1000,f_auto,q_auto/redbullcom/2020/4/28/bjoyslzjb3uxqyg82uz2/minecraft

An alternative logic emphasising construction and computation

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What is Computer Mechanisation?



https://ilyasergey.net/pnp/coq-logo.png

Usage of interactive computer systems to formulate, verify, and automate mathematical proofs

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So what is the thesis about?



The Canon of First-Order Logic Completeness, Undecidability, Incompleteness

The Calculus of Inductive Constructions (CIC)

Main features of CIC (Coquand and Huet, 1988; Paulin-Mohring, 1993):

- Typing judgement x : X prescribes type X to term x, e.g. $5 : \mathbb{N}$ or $(\lambda n. n + 1) : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$
- Simple and dependent type formers: $X \rightarrow Y$, $X \times Y$, X + Y, $\forall x. F x$, $\Sigma x. F x$
- Inductive types: \mathbb{B} , \mathbb{N} , lists $\mathbb{L}(X)$, options $\mathbb{O}(X)$, vectors X^n , ...
- \blacksquare Propositional universe $\mathbb P$ with logical connectives: $\rightarrow,$ $\wedge,$ $\lor,$ $\forall,$ \exists
- \blacksquare $\mathbb P$ is impredicative and (almost) disconnected from computational types

The internal logic of \mathbb{P} is intuitionistic, e.g. the following classical principles are unprovable:

- Law of excluded middle (LEM): $\forall P : \mathbb{P}. P \lor \neg P$
- Markov's principle (MP): $\forall f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{B}$. $\neg \neg (\exists n. f n = tt) \to \exists n. f n = tt$
- There are non-computable functions

Representing First-Order Logic in Constructive Type Theory

Terms and formulas are represented as inductive types \mathbb{T} and \mathbb{F} over a signature $\Sigma = (\mathcal{F}_{\Sigma}, \mathcal{P}_{\Sigma})$:

$$\begin{array}{ll} t:\mathbb{T} & ::= x \mid f \ \vec{t} & (x:\mathbb{N}, f:\mathcal{F}_{\Sigma}, \vec{t}:\mathbb{T}^{|f|}) \\ \varphi, \psi:\mathbb{F} & ::= \perp \mid P \ \vec{t} \mid \varphi \rightarrow \psi \mid \varphi \land \psi \mid \varphi \lor \psi \mid \forall x. \varphi \mid \exists x. \varphi & (P:\mathcal{P}_{\Sigma}, \vec{t}:\mathbb{T}^{|P|}) \end{array}$$

- Natural deduction ($\Gamma \vdash \varphi$) captured by inductive rules of intuitionistic or classical flavour
- Tarski semanticts ($\Gamma \vDash \varphi$) defined recursively over models providing enough structure
- Axioms systems like PA and ZF induce relativised theories, e.g. PA $\vdash \varphi$ and PA $\models \varphi$

Constructive Completeness¹

```
In which situations does \Gamma \vDash \varphi imply \Gamma \vdash \varphi?
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- Gödel: completeness holds (Gödel, 1930)
- Also Gödel: completeness does not hold constructively (Kreisel, 1962)
- Constructive completeness desirable: executable reification of meta-level proof terms
- Rich (and confusing) literature on constructive reverse mathematics of completeness
- We were mostly inspired by Herbelin and Ilik (2016) and Herbelin and Lee (2009)

¹Forster, Kirst, and Wehr (2021)

Model-Theoretic Semantics

Theorem (Quasi-Completeness)

In the negative $(\rightarrow, \forall, \bot)$ -fragment, assuming $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$ implies that $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ does not not hold.

Theorem

In the minimal (\rightarrow, \forall) -fragment, $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$ implies $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$. However, including \perp one observes:

- **1** Completeness for enumerable contexts Γ is equivalent to MP,
- **2** Completeness for arbitrary contexts Γ is equivalent to LEM.
- Constructive for relaxed interpretation of \perp (Veldman, 1976)
- Similar results relating Kripke semantics $\Gamma \Vdash \varphi$ with intuitionistic deduction $\Gamma \vdash_i \varphi$
- Fully constructive completeness for algebraic semantics (Scott, 2008)

The Case of Disjunctions (and Existentials)

Constructivising the metatheory of intuituitionistic epistemic logic (Hagemeier and Kirst, 2022), a propositional modal logic including \lor , we observed the following connections:

Fact (Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic)

- **1** Model Existence is equivalent to WLEM: $\forall P : \mathbb{P} . \neg P \lor \neg \neg P$
- **2** Quasi-Completeness is derivable from DNS: $\forall X. \forall p : X \to \mathbb{P}. (\forall x. \neg \neg p x) \to \neg \neg (\forall x. p x)$
- **3** Quasi-Completeness implies a principle we call WDNS: $\forall p : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{P}$. $\neg \neg (\forall n. \neg p n \lor \neg \neg p n)$
- 4 Not included in the thesis: Quasi-Completeness is derivable from WDNS

We expect the new observations to apply to first-order logic including existentials, therefore:

Conjecture (First-Order Logic)

Quasi-Completeness for the full syntax is equivalent to WDNS.

Synthetic Undecidability²

Which decision problems of first-order logic are undecidable?

- Church/Turing: validity and provability are undecidable (Church, 1936; Turing, 1937)
- Proofs by computable reduction, referring to an explicit model of computation
- Synthetic computability avoids explicit models (Richman, 1983; Bauer, 2006)
- Synthetic undecidability proofs feasible to mechanise (Forster, 2021; Forster et al., 2020)
- Outline: define and verify reduction functions in constructive logic

²Forster, Kirst, and Smolka (2019)

The Entscheidungsproblem

Use the Post correspondence problem (PCP) as seed, with instances $S : \mathbb{L}(\mathbb{B}^* \times \mathbb{B}^*)$:

$$\frac{(s,t) \in S}{S \triangleright (s,t)} \qquad \qquad \frac{S \triangleright (u,v) \quad (s,t) \in S}{S \triangleright (su,tv)} \qquad \qquad \frac{S \triangleright (s,s)}{P C P S}$$

Encode instances S of PCP as formulas φ_S over signature $(e, f_{tt}, f_{ff}; Q, P_)$:

$$\begin{split} \bar{\epsilon} &:= e & \overline{bs} &:= f_b(\bar{s}) \\ \varphi_1 &:= \left[P \, \bar{s} \, \bar{t} \mid (s, t) \in S \right] & \varphi_2 &:= \left[\forall xy. \, P \, x \, y \to P \, (\bar{s}x) \, (\bar{t}y) \mid (s, t) \in S \right] \\ \varphi_3 &:= \forall x. \, P \, x \, x \to Q & \varphi_5 &:= \varphi_1 \to \varphi_2 \to \varphi_3 \to Q \end{split}$$

Verify that this translation describes a reduction function:

Theorem

PCP S iff φ_S is valid, thus PCP reduces to validity.

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Variants of the Entscheidungsproblem

Using the same synthetic method, we obtain undecidability of:

- Satisfiability in Tarski semantics
- Provability in intuitionistic and classical natural deduction
- Validity and satisfiability in Kripke semantics
- Trakhtenbrot's theorem: finite Tarski satisfiability (Kirst and Larchey-Wendling, 2022)
- All the above restricted to binary signature (Hostert, Dudenhefner, and Kirst, 2022)
- Several fragments of Robinson's Q, PA, and ZF (Kirst and Hermes, 2021)

Based on mechanised undecidability proofs of:

- Post correspondence problem (Forster et al., 2018)
- Solvability of Diophantine equations (Larchey-Wendling and Forster, 2019)

Synthetic Incompleteness³

Which axiom systems \mathcal{A} satisfy $\mathcal{A} \vdash \varphi$ or $\mathcal{A} \vdash \neg \varphi$ for all φ ?

- Gödel: all sound, sufficiently expressive ones (Gödel, 1931)
- Rosser: all consistent, sufficiently expressive ones (Rosser, 1936)
- Post/Church/Turing: Gödel's incompleteness is a consequence of undecidability
- Kleene: Rosser's incompleteness is a consequence of recursive inseparability
- We give synthetic computational proofs complementing mechanisations à la Gödel/Rosser: Shankar (1986); O'Connor (2005); Paulson (2015); Popescu and Traytel (2021)

³Kirst and Peters (2023)

Synthetic Church-Turing

Fact

If Robinson's Q (or any sound extension) is complete, then the halting problem is decidable.

Improvement assuming a form of Church's thesis (Richman, 1983; Forster, 2022):

Axiom (EPF)

There is a universal function $\Theta : \mathbb{N} \to (\mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N})$ enumerating all partial functions:

$$\forall f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}. \exists c : \mathbb{N}. \forall xy. \Theta_c x \downarrow y \leftrightarrow f x \downarrow y$$

Theorem

Every axiom system \mathcal{A} representing $K x := \Theta_x x \downarrow$, i.e. providing φ_K with

 $\mathsf{K} x \leftrightarrow \mathcal{A} \vdash \varphi_{\mathsf{K}}(\overline{x})$

neither proves nor refutes $\varphi_{\mathsf{K}}(\overline{c})$ for c being the code of a diagonalisation against K .

Gödel, Rosser, Kleene

Following an idea of Kleene (1951), we derive a stronger version:

Theorem

Every axiom system \mathcal{A} separating $\mathsf{K}^1 x := \Theta_x x \downarrow 1$ and $\mathsf{K}^0 x := \Theta_x x \downarrow 0$, i.e. providing φ_{K} with

$$\mathsf{K}^1 x \to \mathcal{A} \vdash \varphi_{\mathsf{K}}(\overline{x})$$
 and $\mathsf{K}^0 x \to \mathcal{A} \vdash \neg \varphi_{\mathsf{K}}(\overline{x})$

neither proves nor refutes $\varphi_{\mathsf{K}}(\overline{c})$ for c being the code of a diagonalisation against K^1 and K^0 .

To instantiate these abstract proofs to Q, we need a stronger assumption than EPF:

Axiom (CT_Q , cf. Hermes and Kirst (2022))

For every $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ there exists $\varphi(x, y)$ with: $\forall xy. f x \downarrow y \leftrightarrow \mathbb{Q} \vdash \forall y'. \varphi(\overline{x}, y') \leftrightarrow y' = \overline{y}$

Theorem

 CT_Q implies EPF and that Q separates the respective problems K^1 and $\mathsf{K}^0.$ Thus every consistent extension of Q admits an independent sentence.

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Mechanised Metamathematics

A Coq Library for Mechanised First-Order Logic⁴

https://github.com/uds-psl/coq-library-fol

- Merge of all developments into continuously developed core library
- Meant to serve as general framework for future projects, also by external users
- Only well-formed terms and formulas using vectors to implement symbol arities
- Modularity by (type class) parameters for signatures, connectives, and deduction rules
- Mechanised de Bruijn encoding inspired by Autosubst 2 (Stark et al., 2019; Stark, 2019)
- Tool support for syntax, deduction, and semantics (Hostert, Koch, and Kirst, 2021)

⁴Kirst et al. (2022)

Three Levels of Set Theory First-Order, Second-Order, Synthetic

Three Levels of Set Theory in CIC^5

	First-Order	Second-Order	Synthetic
Power sets	$\mathcal{P}(A)$		$X o \mathbb{P}$
Numbers	ω	-	\mathbb{N}
Relations	$\mathcal{P}(A imes B)$	both coincide	$X o Y o \mathbb{P}$
Functions	$\{f \subseteq A \times B \mid \dots\}$	-	X o Y
Cardinality	$\exists f \subseteq A imes B \dots$		$\exists f: X \to Y \dots$
Orderings	$\exists R \subseteq A \times A \dots$		$\exists R: X \to X \to \mathbb{P} \dots$

⁵Kirst and Hermes (2021); Kirst and Smolka (2019); Kirst and Rech (2021)

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Mechanised Metamathematics

Case Study: Sierpiński's Theorem

The Generalised Continuum Hypothesis implies the Axiom of Choice (Sierpiński, 1947)

 $\mathsf{GCH} := \forall AB. |\mathbb{N}| \le |A| \le |B| \le |\mathcal{P}(A)| \to |B| \le |A| \lor |\mathcal{P}(A)| \le |B|$

 $\mathsf{AC} := \forall AB. \forall R \subseteq A \times B. (\forall x. \exists y. R \times y) \rightarrow \exists f : A \rightarrow B. \forall x. R \times (f \times x)$

- Given A, construct a well-ordered set $\aleph(A)$ with $|\aleph(A)| \leq |A|$ but $|\aleph(A)| \leq |\mathcal{P}^6(A)|$
- Iterate GCH to obtain $|A| \leq |\aleph(A)|$, thus A can be well-ordered and satisfies AC
- May use LEM since already weak forms of GCH imply LEM
- FOL: hard work done by Carneiro (2015)
- SOL: simpler mechanisation, delegating cardinal arithmetic to type level
- CIC: construction of $\aleph(A)$ circumventing ordinal theory
- HoTT: natural combination of set-theoretic techniques with type-theoretic primitives

Conclusion

Contributions

- Formalisation: uniform development of metamathematics in constructive type theory
- Mechanisation: reusable Coq libraries advancing original goals of metamathematics
- Constructivisation: fully constructive where possible, sharply analysed otherwise
- Simplification: synthetic method streamlines undecidability and incompleteness proofs
- Orientation: accessible and modern overview of the standard canon of metamathematics

Perspectives

. . . .

There's a lot of things I plan to continue working on:

- What is the constructive status of completeness theorems, really?
- Does the synthetic method help with Gödel's second incompleteness theorem?
- Is there a natural description of the constructible hierarchy in constructive type theory?

Thank you all, for everything!

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Synthetic Decidability and Enumerability

A problem interpreted as a predicate $p: X \to \mathbb{P}$ on a type X is

decidable if there is a function $f: X \to \mathbb{B}$ with

 $\forall x. \, p \, x \leftrightarrow f \, x = \mathrm{tt},$

enumerable if there is a function $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{O}(X)$ with

 $\forall x. \, p \, x \leftrightarrow \exists n. \, f \, n = \lceil x \rceil.$

Fact

Let $p: X \to \mathbb{P}$ be a predicate, then p is

- decidable iff $\forall x. p x + \neg(p x)$ is inhabited and
- enumerable iff there is $L : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{L}(X)$ s.t. $\forall x. p x \leftrightarrow \exists n. x \in L n$.

Synthetic Many-One Reductions

Given predicates $p: X \to \mathbb{P}$ and $q: Y \to \mathbb{P}$ we call a function $f: X \to Y$ a (many-one) reduction from p to q if

 $\forall x.\,p\,x\leftrightarrow q\,(f\,x).$

We write $p \preccurlyeq q$ if a reduction from p to q exists.

Theorem (Reduction)

Let p and q be predicates on data types with $p \preccurlyeq q$.

- If q is decidable/enumerable/co-enumerable, then so is p.
- If p is not co-enumerable, then q is not co-enumerable.

Proof.

If f witnesses $p \preccurlyeq q$ and g decides q, then $g \circ f$ decides p.

Development	Signature	Binding	(AI)-Rule	Weakening
O'Connor	arbitrary	named	side-condition	n.a.
llik	monadic	locally-nameless	co-finite	easy
Herbelin et al.	dyadic	locally-named	side-condition	needs renaming
Han and van Doorn	arbitrary	de Bruijn	shifting	easy
Laurent	full	anti-locnamel.	shifting	easy
Our framework	arbitrary	de Bruijn	shifting	easy

Framework: Tool Support

Tools developed by Hostert, Koch, and Kirst (2021):

- HOAS-input language
 - ► Concrete formulas can be written with Coq binders instead of de Bruijn indices
 - Eases interaction with the syntax
- Proof mode (inspired by Iris proof mode)
 - Tactic and notation layer hiding the proof rules
 - Eases interaction with the deduction systems
- Reification tactic (employing MetaCoq)
 - Extracts first-order formulas from Coq predicates
 - Eases interaction with the semantics

Framework: Usability (Proof Mode)

	1			
205 frewrite (ax_add_zero y).	1 goal			
206 fapply ax refl.	p : peirce			
207 - fintros "x" "TH" "y"	x, y : term			
208 frowrite (ax add rec (σ, v) x)	(1/1)			
$\frac{1}{200}$ from the $(1,1)$ $(1,1)$ $(1,1)$	FAT			
209 frewrite (11 y).	"TH" · ∀ ×0 ×`[+] ⊕ ×0 ×0 ⊕ ×`[+]			
210 Trewrite (ax_add_rec y x). Tappiy ax_reft.	III : V x0; x [I] © x0 == x0 © x [I]			
211 Qed.				
212	uσ x ⊕ y == y ⊕ σ x			
213 Lemma add comm :				
214 FAI $\vdash \langle \langle \forall \rangle x \forall y, x \oplus y \rangle == y \oplus x$.				
215 Proof.				
216 fstart. fapply ((ax_induction (<< Free x, \forall ' y, x \oplus y == y \oplus x))).				
217 - fintros.				
218 frewrite (ax add zero x).				
219 frewrite (add zero r x).				
	Messages / Errors / Jobs /			
220 Tappey average				
222 Trewrite (add_succ_r y x).				
223 frewrite <- ("IH" y).				
224 frewrite (ax_add_rec y x).				
225 fapply ax refl.				
226 Qed.				
227				
228 Lemma pa eg dec :				
229 FAT $\vdash << \forall' \times \forall, (x = y) \forall \neg (x = y).$				
231 fetart				
22 - family ((ay induction (<< Free x, W, y, (x,, y), y = (x,, y))))				
$232 - faply ((a_1)(a_2)(a_2)(a_2)(a_3)(a_3)(a_3)(a_3)(a_3)(a_3)(a_3)(a_3$				
JRK _ TERRIV				

https://github.com/dominik-kirst/coq-library-undecidability/blob/fol-library/theories/FOL/Proofmode/DemoPA.v

Framework: Usability (Reification Tactic)



 ${\tt https://github.com/dominik-kirst/coq-library-undecidability/blob/fol-library/theories/FOL/Reification/DemoPA.velocidabili$

Framework: Deduction Systems

Proof rules are represented as inductive predicates relating a context Γ to a formula φ :

$$\frac{\Gamma[\uparrow] \vdash \varphi}{\Gamma \vdash \forall \varphi} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \forall \varphi}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi[t]} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi[t]}{\Gamma \vdash \exists \varphi} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \exists \varphi \quad \Gamma[\uparrow], \varphi \vdash \psi[\uparrow]}{\Gamma \vdash \psi}$$

. . .

- Quantifier rules use shifted contexts $\Gamma[\uparrow]$ so that x_0 acts as canonical free variable
- Trivialises structural properties like substitutivity and weakening
- Availability of classical rules regulated via type class flag
- Similar representation of sequent calculi and other systems

Framework: Semantics

Tarski models \mathcal{M} are represented as a domain type D and symbol interpretations:

$$f^{\mathcal{M}} : D^{|f|} \to D$$
 $P^{\mathcal{M}} : D^{|P|} \to \mathbb{P}$

- \blacksquare Interpretation of terms and formulas based on assignments $\rho:\mathbb{N}\rightarrow D$
- Term evaluation $\hat{\rho} t$ defined recursively, main rule $\hat{\rho}(f \vec{t}) := f^{\mathcal{M}}(\hat{\rho} \vec{t})$
- Formula satisfaction $\rho \vDash \varphi$ defined recursively, main rule $\rho \vDash P \vec{t} := P^{\mathcal{M}}(\hat{\rho} \vec{t})$
- \blacksquare Induces the logical entailment relation $\Gamma\vDash\varphi$

Framework: Axiom Systems

Concrete axiom systems $\mathcal A$ are modelled as predicates of formulas over a specific signature.

For the example of Peano arithmetic (PA), we instantiate to the arithmetical signature

$$(O, S_{, -} + _, _ \times _; _ \equiv _)$$

and collect the usual axioms, with the induction scheme represented as all instances of

$$\varphi[O] \to (\forall x. \, \varphi[x] \to \varphi[S\,x]) \to \forall x. \, \varphi[x].$$

- Include fragments of PA like Robinson's Q, also several variants of ZF set theory
- Equality \equiv seen as axiomatised symbol of the signature rather than a logical primitive
- Axiom systems \mathcal{A} induce relatives deductive and semantic theories $\mathcal{A} \vdash \varphi$ and $\mathcal{A} \vDash \varphi$

```
Framework: Syntax (Coq)
```

```
Context {sig_funcs : funcs_signature}.
```

```
Context {sig_preds : preds_signature}.
```

```
Inductive falsity_flag := falsity_off | falsity_on.
Existing Class falsity_flag.
```

```
Class operators := {binop : Type ; quantop : Type}.
Context {ops : operators}.
```

Framework: Deduction Systems (Coq)

```
Context {sig_funcs : funcs_signature}.
Context {sig_preds : preds_signature}.
```

```
Reserved Notation 'A \vdash phi' (at level 61).
```

```
Inductive peirce := class | intu.
Existing Class peirce.
```

```
Inductive prv : forall (ff : falsity_flag) (p : peirce), list form -> form -> Prop :=

| II {ff} {p} A phi psi : phi::A \vdash psi -> A \vdash phi --> psi

| IE {ff} {p} A phi psi : A \vdash phi --> psi -> A \vdash phi -> A \vdash psi

| AllI {ff} {p} A phi : map (subst_form \uparrow) A \vdash phi -> A \vdash dphi

| AllE {ff} {p} A t phi : A \vdash d phi -> A \vdash phi[t..]

| Exp {p} A phi : prv p A falsity -> prv p A phi

| Ctx {ff} {p} A phi : phi el A -> A \vdash phi

| Pc {ff} A phi psi : prv class A (((phi --> psi) --> phi) --> phi)

where 'A \vdash phi' := (prv _ A phi).
```

```
Framework: Semantics (Cog)
Context {domain : Type}.
Class interp := B I
  { i_func : forall f : syms, vec domain (ar_syms f) -> domain ;
    i_atom : forall P : preds, vec domain (ar_preds P) -> Prop ; }.
Definition env := nat -> domain.
Context {I : interp}.
Fixpoint eval (rho : env) (t : term) : domain := match t with
  | var s => rho s
  func f v => i_func (Vector.map (eval rho) v) end.
Fixpoint sat {ff : falsity_flag} (rho : env) (phi : form) : Prop := match phi with
    atom P v => i_atom (Vector.map (eval rho) v)
    falsity => False
    bin Impl phi psi => sat rho phi -> sat rho psi
    quant All phi => forall d : domain, sat (d .: rho) phi end.
```

Analysing Completeness Theorems in Constructive Meta-Theory

Confusing situation in the literature on first-order logic:

- Completeness equivalent to Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem (Henkin, 1954)
- Completeness requires Markov's Principle (Kreisel, 1962)
- Completeness equivalent to Weak König's Lemma (Simpson, 2009)
- Completeness holds fully constructively (Krivine, 1996)

Systematic investigation missing:

- Started consolidation by Herbelin and Ilik (2016) and Forster et al. (2021)
- Comprehensive overview of current landscape by Herbelin (2022)

The Issue with Disjunction

Truth Lemma case for disjunctions $\varphi \lor \psi$:

$$\begin{split} \varphi \lor \psi \in \mathcal{T} & \stackrel{?}{\longleftrightarrow} \mathcal{T} \Vdash \varphi \lor \psi \\ & \stackrel{\mathsf{def}}{\longleftrightarrow} \mathcal{T} \Vdash \varphi \lor \mathcal{T} \Vdash \psi \\ & \stackrel{\mathsf{H}}{\longleftrightarrow} \varphi \in \mathcal{T} \lor \psi \in \mathcal{T} \end{split}$$

So we really need prime theories for disjunctions

Primeness from Lindenbaum Extension is constructive no-go

Backwards Analysis

Two proofs of Quasi-Completeness from incomparable principles...

Fact

Model Existence implies WLEM.

Proof.

Given *P*, use model existence on $\mathcal{T} := \{x_0 \lor \neg x_0\} \cup \{x_0 \mid P\} \cup \{\neg x_0 \mid \neg P\}$. We have $\mathcal{T} \not\vdash \bot$ so if $\mathcal{M} \Vdash \mathcal{T}$, then either $\mathcal{M} \Vdash x_0$ or $\mathcal{M} \Vdash \neg x_0$, so either $\neg \neg P$ or $\neg P$, respectively.

Fact

Quasi-Completeness implies the following principle: $\forall p : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{P}$. $\neg \neg (\forall n. \neg p \ n \lor \neg \neg p \ n)$

Proof.

Using similar tricks for $\mathcal{T} := \{x_n \lor \neg x_n\} \cup \{x_n \mid p \ n\} \cup \{\neg x_n \mid \neg p \ n\}$, see backup slide.

Obvious consequence both from WLEM and DNS, maybe enough for Quasi-Completeness?

Weak Double-Negation Shift (Preliminary Name)

$$\mathsf{WDNS} := \forall p : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{P}. \neg \neg (\forall n. \neg p \, n \lor \neg \neg p \, n)$$

Lemma

Assuming WDNS, every stable quasi-prime theory is not not prime.

Proof.

Assume \mathcal{T} not prime and derive a contradiction. Given the negative goal, from WDNS we obtain $\forall \varphi. \neg(\varphi \in \mathcal{T}) \lor \neg \neg(\varphi \in \mathcal{T})$. This yields exactly the instances of WLEM needed to derive that \mathcal{T} is prime, contradiction.

WDNS turns stable predicates $p:\mathbb{N}\to\mathbb{P}$ not not decidable, contributes to Fan Theorem

Already the Lemma turns out to be enough for Quasi-Completeness!

Quasi-Completeness via WDNS

Refined proof outline using WDNS:

- Lindenbaum Extension: if $\mathcal{T} \not\vdash \varphi$ then there is stable not not prime \mathcal{T}' with $\mathcal{T}' \not\vdash \varphi$
- Universal Model: consistent stable prime theories related by inclusion
- Truth Lemma: $\varphi \in \mathcal{T} \iff \mathcal{T} \Vdash \varphi$
- **Pseudo** Model Existence: if $\mathcal{T} \not\vdash \varphi$ then there not not is \mathcal{M} with $\mathcal{M} \Vdash \mathcal{T}$ and $\mathcal{M} \not\models \varphi$
- Quasi-Completeness: if $\mathcal{T} \Vdash \varphi$ then $\neg \neg (\mathcal{T} \vdash \varphi)$
- Completeness: anyway no constructive consequence of Quasi-Completeness

Encoding the Post Correspondence Problem

We use the signature $\Sigma_{\mathsf{PCP}} := (\{\star^0, e^0, f_{\mathsf{tt}}^1, f_{\mathsf{ff}}^1\}; \{P^2, \prec^2, \equiv^2\}):$

- Chains like $f_{\rm ff}(f_{\rm tt}(e))$ represent strings while \star signals overflow
- P concerns only defined values and \prec is a strict ordering:

$$\begin{array}{l} \varphi_{\mathcal{P}} := \dot{\forall} xy. \ \mathcal{P} \, x \, y \, \dot{\rightarrow} \, x \not\equiv \star \, \dot{\wedge} \, y \not\equiv \star \\ \varphi_{\prec} := (\dot{\forall} x. \, x \not\prec x) \, \dot{\wedge} \, (\dot{\forall} xyz. \, x \prec y \, \dot{\rightarrow} \, y \prec z \, \dot{\rightarrow} \, x \prec z) \end{array}$$

Sanity checks on *f* regarding overflow, disjointness, and injectivity:

$$\varphi_{f} := \begin{pmatrix} f_{tt} \star \equiv \star \land f_{ff} \star \equiv \star \\ \forall x. f_{tt} x \neq e \\ \forall x. f_{ff} x \neq e \end{pmatrix} \land \begin{pmatrix} \forall xy. f_{tt} x \neq \star \rightarrow f_{tt} x \equiv f_{tt} y \rightarrow x \equiv y \\ \forall xy. f_{ff} x \neq \star \rightarrow f_{ff} x \equiv f_{ff} y \rightarrow x \equiv y \\ \forall xy. f_{tt} x \equiv t_{ff} y \rightarrow f_{tt} x \equiv \star \land f_{ff} y \equiv \star \end{pmatrix}$$

Trakhtenbrot's Theorem

Given an instance R of PCP, we construct a formula φ_R by:

$$\varphi_{R} := \varphi_{P} \land \varphi_{\prec} \land \varphi_{f} \land \varphi_{\triangleright} \land \exists x. P \times x$$

Crucially, we enforce that *P* satisfies the inversion principle of $R \triangleright (s, t)$:

$$\varphi_{\triangleright} := \dot{\forall} xy. P x y \rightarrow \bigvee_{(s,t)\in R}^{\cdot} \dot{\lor} \begin{cases} x \equiv \overline{s} \land y \equiv \overline{t} \\ \exists uv. P u v \land x \equiv \overline{s}u \land y \equiv \overline{t}v \land (u,v) \prec (x,y) \end{cases}$$

Theorem

PCP *R* iff FSATEQ(
$$\Sigma_{PCP}$$
; \equiv) φ_R , hence PCP \preccurlyeq FSATEQ(Σ_{PCP} ; \equiv).

Proof.

If R has a solution of length n, then φ_R is satisfied by the model of strings of length bounded by n. Conversely, if $\mathcal{M} \vDash_{\rho} \varphi_R$ we can extract a solution of R from φ_{\triangleright} by well-founded induction on $\prec^{\mathcal{M}}$ (which is applicable since \mathcal{M} is finite).

Sketch for Peano Arithmetic

Use axiomatisation PA over standard signature $(0, S, +, \cdot; \equiv)$.

Diophantine constraints (cf. Larchey-Wendling and Forster (2019)):

- Instances are lists L of constraints $x_i = 1 | x_i + x_j = x_k | x_i \cdot x_j = x_k$
- L is solvable if there is an evaluation $\eta:\mathbb{N}\to\mathbb{N}$ solving all constraints

Theorem

$$L = [c_1, \ldots, c_k]$$
 with maximal index x_n is solvable iff $\mathsf{PA} \vDash \exists^n c_1 \land \cdots \land c_k$

Proof.

If *L* has solution η instantiate the existential quantifiers with numerals $\overline{\eta_1}, \ldots, \overline{\eta_n}$. Then the axioms of PA entail the constraints. If PA $\models \exists^n c_1 \land \cdots \land c_k$ use the standard model \mathbb{N} to extract solution η .

Sketch for ZF Set Theory

Use axiomatisation ZF over explicit signature $(\emptyset, \{_, _\}, \bigcup, \mathcal{P}, \omega; \equiv, \in)$.

Reduction from PCP:

- \blacksquare Boolean encoding: $\overline{tt}=\{\emptyset,\emptyset\}$ and $\overline{tt}=\emptyset$
- String encoding: $\overline{\operatorname{tt}}\operatorname{ff}\operatorname{ff}\operatorname{tt} = (\overline{\operatorname{tt}}, (\overline{\operatorname{ff}}, (\overline{\operatorname{tt}}, (\overline{\operatorname{ff}}, \emptyset))))$
- Stack encoding: $\overline{S} = \{(\overline{s_1}, \overline{t_1}), \dots, (\overline{s_k}, \overline{t_k})\}$
- Combination encoding: $S \leftrightarrow B := \bigcup_{s/t \in S} \{(\overline{s}x, \overline{t}y) \mid (x, y) \in B\}$
- $f \triangleright n := (\emptyset, \overline{S}) \in f \land \forall (k, B) \in f. k \in n \rightarrow (k + 1, S + B) \in f$

$$\varphi_{\mathcal{S}} := \exists f, n, B, x. n \in \omega \land f \triangleright n \land (n, B) \in f \land (x, x) \in B$$

Theorem

PCP S iff $ZF \vDash \varphi_S$ and PCP S iff $ZF \vdash \varphi_S$.

Proof.

$\mathsf{Direction} \to \mathsf{by} \text{ internal proofs and} \gets \mathsf{relies on standard model } \mathcal{S}.$

Thesis Colloquium Talk

Incompleteness: Halting Problem

Fact

 K_Θ is undecidable, in fact for every candidate decider $d:\mathbb{N} \rightharpoonup \mathbb{B}$ with

 $\forall x. \mathsf{K}_{\Theta} x \leftrightarrow d \, x \downarrow \mathsf{tt}$

one can construct a concrete value x with $\neg K_{\Theta} x$ such that $d \times \uparrow$.

Proof.

We first define the partial function $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{B}$ such that $f \times \downarrow$ tt whenever $d \times \downarrow$ ff and $f \times \uparrow$ otherwise. Now using EPF we obtain a code c for f and deduce for x := c that

$$dx \downarrow tt \Leftrightarrow K_{\Theta}x \Leftrightarrow \Theta_x x \downarrow \Leftrightarrow fx \downarrow \Leftrightarrow fx \downarrow tt \Leftrightarrow dc \downarrow ff$$

from which we conclude $d \times \uparrow$. That K_{Θ} is not decidable follows since every decider $\mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{B}$ would induce a total candidate decider $\mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{B}$.

Incompleteness: Recursive Inseparability

Fact

 K^1_{Θ} and K^0_{Θ} are recursively inseparable, in fact for every candidate separator $s: \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{B}$ with

$$\forall x. \ (\mathsf{K}^{1}_{\Theta} x \to s \, x \downarrow \mathsf{tt}) \ \land \ (\mathsf{K}^{0}_{\Theta} x \to s \, x \downarrow \mathsf{ff})$$

one can construct a concrete value x with $\neg K_{\Theta}^1 \times and \neg K_{\Theta}^0 \times such that s \times \uparrow$.

Proof.

We define the partial function $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{B}$ such that $f \times \downarrow$ ff if $s \times \downarrow$ tt, $f \times \downarrow$ tt if $s \times \downarrow$ ff, and $f \times \uparrow$ otherwise. Using EPF we obtain a code c for f and deduce for x := c that

$$sx \downarrow tt \Leftrightarrow fx \downarrow ff \Leftrightarrow \Theta_x x \downarrow 0 \Leftrightarrow \mathsf{K}^0_{\Theta} x \Rightarrow sx \downarrow ff$$
$$sx \downarrow ff \Leftrightarrow fx \downarrow tt \Leftrightarrow \Theta_x x \downarrow 1 \Leftrightarrow \mathsf{K}^1_{\Theta} x \Rightarrow sx \downarrow tt$$

from which we conclude $s \times \uparrow$.

Incompleteness: Partial Decider

Lemma (Partial Decider)

One can construct a partial function $d_{\mathcal{S}} : \mathbb{S} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$ with:

$$\forall \varphi. \ (\vdash \varphi \leftrightarrow d_{\mathcal{S}} \varphi \downarrow \mathsf{tt}) \land \ (\vdash \neg \varphi \leftrightarrow d_{\mathcal{S}} \varphi \downarrow \mathsf{ff})$$

Note that by this specification d_S exactly diverges on the independent sentences of S.

Lemma

Let $d_{\mathcal{S}}$ be the partial decider to \mathcal{S} .

1 If S represents K_{Θ} , then d_S is a candidate decider for K_{Θ} .

2 If S separates K^1_{Θ} and K^0_{Θ} , then d_S is a candidate separator for K^1_{Θ} and K^0_{Θ} .

First-Order Set Theory⁶

Axiomatise ZF set theory over a suitable signature using first-order formulas:

 $\forall xy. x \subseteq y \rightarrow y \subseteq x \rightarrow x = y \qquad \forall x. x \notin \emptyset \qquad \forall xy. y \in \mathcal{P}(x) \leftrightarrow y \subseteq x$

Separation and replacement represented as axiom schemes in $\varphi(x)$ and functional $\psi(x, y)$:

$$\forall x. \exists y. \forall z. z \in y \leftrightarrow z \in x \land \varphi(z) \qquad \forall x. \exists y. \forall z. z \in y \leftrightarrow \exists u \in x. \psi(u, z)$$

Verifying a set-theoretic result means to derive $\mathsf{ZF} \vdash \varphi$ or $\mathsf{ZF} \models \varphi$

- Limited to first-order encodings of functions, ordinals, cumulative hierarchy, etc.
- Undecidability obtained with usual method, provided a model exists (cf. Werner (1997))
- Incompleteness applies both to deduction and semantics

⁶Kirst and Hermes (2021)

Second-Order Set Theory⁷

Axiomatise a type \mathcal{M} with relation $\in : \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{M} \to \mathbb{P}$ and set-theoretic operations:

 $\forall xy: \mathcal{M}. x \subseteq y \rightarrow y \subseteq x \rightarrow x = y \qquad \forall x: \mathcal{M}. x \notin \emptyset \qquad \forall xy: \mathcal{M}. y \in \mathcal{P}(x) \leftrightarrow y \subseteq x$

Separation and replacement quantify over all predicates, as intended by Zermelo (1930):

 $\forall p: \mathcal{M} \to \mathbb{P}. \forall xy. y \in p \cap x \leftrightarrow y \in x \land px \quad \forall F: \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{M}. \forall xy. y \in F@x \leftrightarrow \exists z \in x. y = Fz$

Verifying a set-theoretic result means to show it for \mathcal{M} (possibly assuming UC, FE, PE)

- Function spaces coincide, ordinals and cumulative hierarchy can be described inductively
- Undecidability could be shown if given in second-order syntax (e.g. Koch and Kirst, 2022)
- Incompleteness applies only to deduction, semantics is nearly determined

⁷Kirst (2018)

Synthetic Set Theory⁸

Use type-theoretic structure to represent set-theoretic operations:

 $\mathbb{O}, \mathbb{B}, \mathbb{N}, X \times Y, X + Y, X \to Y, X \to \mathbb{P}, \ldots$

Separation is a sigma type over a predicate, replacement a sigma type over a function range:

$$\lambda X. \lambda p: X o \mathbb{P}. \Sigma x: X. p x \qquad \lambda XY. \lambda F: X o Y. \Sigma y: Y. \exists x: X. y = F x$$

Verifying a set-theoretic result means to show a type-theoretic result (assuming UC, FE, PE)

- No intermediate axiomatisation at all, simply work with type-theoretic primitives
- No external results like undecidability or incompleteness can be shown
- Internal results may may rely on alternative constructions

⁸Kirst and Rech (2021)

Constructing Large Ordinals: $|\aleph(A)| \not\leq |A|$

Definition

The Hartogs number of a set A is the class $\aleph(A) := \lambda \alpha \in \mathcal{O}$. $|\alpha| \leq |A|$.

TheoremThe Hartogs number $\aleph(A)$ of A satisfies the following properties: $\blacksquare |\aleph(A)| \le |\mathcal{P}^6(A)|$ $\geqq \aleph(A) \in \mathcal{O}$ $\exists |\aleph(A)| \le |A|$ Proof

- **1** By representing ordinals $|\alpha| \leq |A|$ as well-ordered subsets of A.
- 2 Straightforward by definition of ordinals.
- **3** Straightforward by definition of $\aleph(A)$.

Sierpiński's Theorem: Proof

Proof.

Assume GCH, to show AC it suffices to show that every infinite type is well-orderable. So for some infinite X, apply GCH to the situation obtained by Lemma 1:

$$|\mathcal{P}^2(X)| \leq |\mathcal{P}^2(X) + leph(X)| \leq |\mathcal{P}^3(X)|$$

- $|\mathcal{P}^2(X) + leph(X)| \le |\mathcal{P}^2(X)|$ yields $|leph(X)| \le |\mathcal{P}^2(X)|$, start again
- $|\mathcal{P}^3(X)| \leq |\mathcal{P}^2(X) + leph(X)|$ yields $|\mathcal{P}^3(X)| \leq |leph(X)|$ by Lemma 2

Lemma 1.

If X is infinite, then
$$|X| = |\mathbb{1} + X|$$
 and $|\mathcal{P}(X)| = |\mathcal{P}(X) + \mathcal{P}(X)|$.

Lemma 2.

If
$$|\mathcal{P}(X)| \leq |X+Y|$$
 and $|X+X| \leq |X|$, then already $|\mathcal{P}(X)| \leq |Y|$.