

Gödel's Theorem Without Tears

Essential Incompleteness in Synthetic Computability

Final Bachelor Talk

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Essential Incompleteness in Synthetic Computability

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¹Abstract title: "Strong, Synthetic, and Computational Proofs of Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem"

Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem

Gödel's first incompleteness theorem²

Any effective, sound, and sufficiently powerful formal logic is incomplete.

- ▶ Has been mechanised often³
- ▶ We present Kleene's folklore and strengthened incompleteness proofs using computability theory *abstractly*
- ▶ We formalise them in the setting of *synthetic computability theory*, avoiding low-level manipulations
- ▶ We instantiate these results to first-order Robinson arithmetic
- ▶ All results have been mechanised in Coq⁴

²Gödel 1931.

³Shankar 1994; O'Connor 2005; Harrison 2009; Paulson 2014; Popescu and Traytel 2019.

⁴<https://github.com/uds-psl/coq-synthetic-incompleteness/tree/bachelor>

Abstract Incompleteness Proofs

Instantiation to first-order Robinson arithmetic

We work in CIC, where we can consider the function space to only contain computable functions

Definition

A predicate $P : X \rightarrow \mathbb{P}$ is

- ▶ enumerable if $\exists f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{O}(X). Px \leftrightarrow \exists k. fk = \ulcorner x \urcorner$.
- ▶ decidable if $\exists f : X \rightarrow \mathbb{B}. Px \leftrightarrow fx = tt$.

⁵Richman 1983; Bauer 2006.

Definition (Formal system)

$\mathcal{F} = (S, \neg, \vdash)$ is a formal system if:

- ▶ $S : \mathbb{T}$ is a discrete type of sentences
- ▶ $\neg : S \rightarrow S$ is a negation function
- ▶ $\vdash : S \rightarrow \mathbb{P}$ is an enumerable provability predicate
- ▶ \mathcal{F} is consistent: $\forall s. \neg(\mathcal{F} \vdash s \wedge \mathcal{F} \vdash \neg s)$

\mathcal{F} is complete if $\forall s. \mathcal{F} \vdash s \vee \mathcal{F} \vdash \neg s$.

First-order logic over a consistent and enumerable axiomatisation is a formal system in this sense

Lemma

There is a partial function $d_{\mathcal{F}} : S \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$ separating provability from refutability:

$$\forall s. (d_{\mathcal{F}} s \triangleright tt \leftrightarrow \mathcal{F} \vdash s) \wedge (d_{\mathcal{F}} s \triangleright ff \leftrightarrow \mathcal{F} \vdash \neg s)$$

If \mathcal{F} is complete, $d_{\mathcal{F}}$ is total.

Corollary

Any complete formal system is decidable.

Kleene's Folklore Incompleteness Proof^{6,7}

Theorem

Let \mathcal{F} be complete and weakly represent $P : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{P}$, i.e., there is an $r : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow S$ s.t.:

$$\forall x. Px \leftrightarrow \mathcal{F} \vdash rx$$

Then P is decidable. Thus, if P is undecidable, \mathcal{F} is incomplete.

⁶Kleene 1936; Turing 1936.

⁷As mechanised by Kirst and Hermes 2021.

Axiom (EPF⁸)

There is a function $\theta : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$ such that:

$$\forall f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}. \exists c. f \equiv \theta c$$

Definition (Self-halting problem)

The self-halting problem is defined as:

$$\mathcal{H} := \lambda x. \exists b. \theta x x \triangleright b$$

⁸Richman 1983; Forster 2022.

⁹Kreisel 1967; Troelstra and van Dalen 1988.

Self-halting problem

Fact

Partial functions $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$ agreeing with the halting problem $\mathcal{H} := \lambda x. \exists b. \theta x x \triangleright b$:

$$\forall x. x \in \mathcal{H} \leftrightarrow fx \triangleright tt,$$

diverge on some input c , i.e., $\forall b. fc \not\triangleright b$.

Proof.

Consider $g : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$,

$$gx := \begin{cases} ff & \text{if } fx \triangleright tt \\ \text{undefined} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Let c be the code of g . We have $fc \triangleright tt \leftrightarrow fc \triangleright ff$. □

Strengthening the Folklore Proof¹⁰

Theorem

Assume \mathcal{F} weakly represents \mathcal{H} , i.e., there is an $r : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow S$ s.t.: $\forall x. x \in \mathcal{H} \leftrightarrow \mathcal{F} \vdash rx$
Then \mathcal{F} has an independent sentence rc :

$$\mathcal{F} \not\vdash rc \wedge \mathcal{F} \not\vdash \neg rc$$

Proof.

$h := d_{\mathcal{F}} \circ r : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$ agrees with the halting problem:

$$\forall x. d_{\mathcal{F}}(rx) \triangleright tt \leftrightarrow \mathcal{F} \vdash rx \leftrightarrow x \in \mathcal{H},$$

and therefore diverges on some input c . Thus rc is independent in \mathcal{F} . □

¹⁰Kleene 1952.

Going from Soundness to Consistency

- ▶ Consider weak representability:

$$\forall x. Px \leftrightarrow \mathcal{F} \vdash rx$$

Definition

A formal system \mathcal{F}' is an extension of \mathcal{F} , if

$$\forall s. \mathcal{F} \vdash s \rightarrow \mathcal{F}' \vdash s$$

- ▶ Only transfers along extensions that preserve $\mathcal{F} \vdash rx \rightarrow Px$, i.e., sound extensions
- ▶ Can we do better?

Theorem

Consider the following predicates:

$$\mathcal{I}_{tt} := \lambda x. \theta x x \triangleright tt \quad \mathcal{I}_{ff} := \lambda x. \theta x x \triangleright ff$$

They are recursively inseparable, i.e., any partial function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$ s.t.

$$\forall x. (x \in \mathcal{I}_{tt} \rightarrow fx \triangleright tt) \quad \wedge \quad (x \in \mathcal{I}_{ff} \rightarrow fx \triangleright ff)$$

diverges on some input.

Kleene's Improved Incompleteness Proof¹¹

Theorem

Assume \mathcal{F} strongly separates \mathcal{I}_{tt} and \mathcal{I}_{ff} , i.e., there is an $r : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow S$ s.t.:

$$\forall x. x \in \mathcal{I}_{tt} \rightarrow \mathcal{F} \vdash rx \quad \wedge \quad x \in \mathcal{I}_{ff} \rightarrow \mathcal{F} \vdash \neg rx$$

Any (consistent) extension \mathcal{F}' of \mathcal{F} has an independent sentence rc :

$$\mathcal{F}' \not\vdash rc \wedge \mathcal{F}' \not\vdash \neg rc$$

Proof.

$h := d_{\mathcal{F}'} \circ r : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$ recursively separates \mathcal{I}_{tt} and \mathcal{I}_{ff} , and therefore diverges on some input c . Therefore, rc is independent in \mathcal{F}' . \square

¹¹Kleene 1951, c.f. Kleene 1952; Kleene 1967

Abstract Incompleteness Proofs

Instantiation to first-order Robinson arithmetic

Instantiating the Incompleteness Proofs

From now on: Assume θ in EPF to be an interpreter for μ -recursive functions

Lemma

FA¹² weakly represents any enumerable predicate $P : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{P}$ using a Σ_1 -formula φ :

$$\forall x. Px \leftrightarrow \text{FA} \vdash \varphi(\bar{x})$$


Proof.

See Kirst and Hermes 2021, relying on a mechanisation of the DPRM theorem by Larchey-Wendling and Forster 2022. □

Goal: Show that Robinson arithmetic is strong enough to strongly separate any pair of enumerable and disjoint predicates.

¹²A subset of Robinson arithmetic.

Path Towards Rosser's Trick



Rosser's Trick for Strong Separability


Let P_1, P_2 be enumerable and disjoint predicates, and $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 \in \Delta_0$ such that:

$$P_1 x \leftrightarrow Q \vdash \exists k. \varphi_1(\bar{x}, k) \quad P_2 x \leftrightarrow Q \vdash \exists l. \varphi_2(\bar{x}, l)$$

We want to find Φ_1 such that for all x :

$$P_1 x \rightarrow Q \vdash \exists k. \Phi_1(\bar{x}, k)$$

$$P_2 x \rightarrow Q \vdash \neg \exists k. \Phi_1(\bar{x}, k)$$



$$\Phi_1(x, k) := \varphi_1(x, k) \wedge \forall k' \leq k. \neg \varphi_2(x, k')$$

Instantiating the Strengthened Incompleteness Proof

Theorem

Robinson arithmetic is essentially incomplete.

$$\forall T \supseteq \mathbb{Q}. \quad T \text{ enumerable} \rightarrow T \not\vdash \perp \rightarrow \exists \varphi. T \not\vdash \varphi \wedge T \not\vdash \neg \varphi$$

$$\forall T \supseteq \mathbb{Q}. \quad T \text{ enumerable} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \models T \rightarrow (\forall \varphi. T \vdash \varphi \vee T \vdash \neg \varphi) \rightarrow \mathcal{H}_{\text{TM}} \text{ decidable}$$




Summary

- ▶ Gave abstract incompleteness proofs due to Kleene in different strengths, reformulated in synthetic computability
 - ▶ Assuming weak representability, using the halting problem
 - ▶ Assuming strong separability, using recursively inseparable predicates
 - ▶ Mechanised in only about 450 stand-alone lines of Coq, 200 for the strongest result
- ▶ Instantiated those proofs to first-order Robinson arithmetic using Rosser's trick
 - ▶ Relying on libraries of undecidability¹³ and first-order logic¹⁴
 - ▶ Mechanised in around 2200 lines of Coq
- ▶ Future Work:
 - ▶ Church's thesis for Robinson arithmetic
 - ▶ Avoid DPRM
 - ▶ Gödel's second incompleteness theorem








¹³Forster et al. 2020.

¹⁴Kirst, Hostert, et al. 2022.







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Church's thesis

$$\forall f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}. \exists \varphi \in \Sigma_1. \forall xy. fx \triangleright y \leftrightarrow Q \vdash \forall y'. \varphi(\bar{x}, y') \leftrightarrow y = y'$$